Unqualified Appraisal: Lǚ Méng
Someone needs to write a proper story about him already
I really wasn’t expecting to write this one any time soon, but then I covered Zhōu Yú and Lǔ Sù and figured, well, might as well.
I think I get the hate for Lǚ Méng. He’s the guy who “killed” Guān Yǔ in the standard mythology, and as everyone has come to venerate Guān Yǔ, naturally everyone hates Lǚ Méng and celebrates the standard mythology story where Guān Yǔ’s vengeful spirit possesses and kills Lǚ Méng from beyond the grave.
Oh, sorry, spoiler alert for that 500 year old novel: after Lǚ Méng kills Guān Yǔ, Guān Yǔ’s ghost comes back and kills Lǚ Méng in revenge.
Summary
Lǚ Méng’s biographical entry in the historiography does not mention any illustrious ancestry or clansmen who reached high level office. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility of the family having some measure of wealth and influence on a more local scale that was still too low level to be considered worth mentioning by the historiography compilers, but the Lǚ clan of Rǔnán was probably at least a few steps lower in status from the Zhōu clan of Lújiāng, which had two of its members reach the highest levels of the government bureaucracy, or the Lǔ clan of Línhuái, which the historiography did think worth noting as possessing immense wealth and local prestige. In any case, whatever the Lǚ clan’s former status might have been in Rǔnán, the family probably became refugees when they moved south of the Jiāng, considering the chaos sweeping through the central plains in the collapse of the Hàn empire.
It is recorded that Lǚ Méng became a dependent of his elder sister’s husband Dèng Dāng, who became an officer under Sūn Cè. When Lǚ Méng was about fifteen to sixteen, he secretly joined the army that Dèng Dāng was leading to suppress local Shānyuè tribes. When Dèng Dāng discovered this he was greatly alarmed and shouted at him, but could not stop him. Upon returning, Dāng told Lǚ Méng’s mother what had happened, and Lǚ Méng’s furious mother wished to punish Lǚ Méng, but Lǚ Méng defended his actions stating that such military service was the only way that their family could hope to escape poverty and reach riches and honor. His mother was sorrowful but let him go.1 This anecdote probably serves as evidence that the Lǚ family probably was not too well off after its relocation, and that Lǚ Méng intended to change that.
There was an officer under Dèng Dāng who belittled Lǚ Méng for his youth, remarking that allowing such a young boy participate in battle was like giving meat to a tiger. One day, the officer insulted Lǚ Méng to his face, and a furious Lǚ Méng drew a sword and killed the officer. Lǚ Méng then fled and escaped, but later turned himself in. Word of this incident reached even Sūn Cè, and the intrigued Sūn Cè summoned Lǚ Méng to a meeting. Sūn Cè was impressed with Lǚ Méng and installed Lǚ Méng in his own personal following.2
A few years later, Dèng Dāng died, and Lǚ Méng inherited command of Dèng Dāng’s division, reportedly at the recommendation of none other than the senior officer Zhāng Zhāo. In 200, Sūn Cè died and was succeeded by his younger brother Sūn Quán, and Quán sought to reorganize the military by combining together smaller units. Lǚ Méng secretly borrowed money to purchase new uniforms and equipment for his troops, and then led them in drills and exercises. When Sūn Quán came on inspection and saw this, he was greatly pleased and increased Lǚ Méng’s command. Lǚ Méng participated in campaigns in Dānyáng, having military achievements wherever he went and reaching higher ranks and appointments.3
In about 208, Lǚ Méng participated in the campaigns against Huáng Zǔ, where he commanded the front division and personally took the head of Huáng Zǔ’s front division officer Chén Jiù, allowing the main army to follow up on the victory to attack Huáng Zǔ’s base directly. When Huáng Zǔ heard that Chén Jiù had been killed, he attempted to flee, but was pursued and also killed. In the aftermath of the victory, Sūn Quán gave great credit to the initial successes in breaking the front divisions under Chén Jiù, and Lǚ Méng was rewarded with higher rank and a bestowment of cash.4
Of course, that same year, Cáo Cāo came south, and was famously defeated by allied forces led by Zhōu Yú and Chéng Pǔ.5 As Cáo Cāo retreated back north, Zhōu Yú followed up on the victory by attacking the remaining garrisons commanded by Cáo Cāo’s officer Cáo Rén. An officer from Yì province Xí Sù led his troops to surrender,6 and Zhōu Yú wished to have Xí Sù’s troops transferred to Lǚ Méng’s command. However, Lǚ Méng argued that Xí Sù’s surrender must be rewarded, and so it would not be appropriate to take away his troops. Sūn Quán agreed with this assessment and returned Xí Sù’s troops.7
Lǚ Méng participated in the campaign against Cáo Rén, where he is credited with two major achievements. Zhōu Yú had sent a separate division under Gān Níng to establish a position at Yílíng to outflank Cáo Rén’s main position at Jiānglíng, and Cáo Rén had divided his forces to attack Gān Níng’s position. Gān Níng was hard pressed and requested rescue, but most of the officers believed that their forces were too few to divide further and rescue Gān Níng. Lǚ Méng however believed and argued that they should lead their main force to rescue Gān Níng and leave a small garrison under Líng Tǒng, judging that Líng Tǒng would be able to hold out for at least ten days and that they could rescue Gān Níng and return within that time. Lǚ Méng also advised setting up wooden barricades to cut off a possible retreat line for Cáo Rén’s cavalry. Zhōu Yú accepted this plan, and the Wú forces were able to successfully relieve Yílíng. Furthermore, as the enemy cavalry retreated, they were indeed forced to abandon their horses due to the barricades, just as Lǚ Méng had predicted, leading to the capture of three hundred horses, a very valuable gain given the general lack of horses in the south. At the completion of the campaign, Cáo Rén was forced to withdraw north, and in the distribution of rewards, Lǚ Méng reached a low miscellaneous title general’s rank.8
In 210, Zhōu Yú died and was succeeded by Lǔ Sù as Sūn Quán’s chief commander in the west. At this time, Lǔ Sù arranged for a transfer of the territory about Jiānglíng to Liú Bèi, and so withdrew his garrison east downstream from Jiānglíng to Lùkǒu, and during the journey passed by Lǚ Méng’s garrison. Lǔ Sù thought little of Lǚ Méng, but someone advised him that Lǚ Méng was clearly a rising star among the officers of Wú and therefore could not be snubbed, and so Lǔ Sù went to pay Lǚ Méng a visit. At their meeting, Lǚ Méng discussed the challenges of the new border situation with Liú Bèi and Bèi’s officer Guān Yǔ, and presented several possible strategies and contingency plans. Lǔ Sù was incredibly impressed and changed his views of Lǚ Méng.9
An annotation from Jiāngbiǎozhuàn elaborates on this anecdote, connecting it to another anecdote concerning Lǚ Méng’s development as a strategic thinker: previously, when Lǚ Méng and fellow officer Jiǎng Qīn were beginning their careers, Sūn Quán had urged both of them to take time to study. Lǚ Méng replied that with all the burdens and duties of military service, there was no time to read books, but Sūn Quán stated that he was not asking them to become scholars, only to gain some degree of learning and understanding, and further added that his own burdens and duties were certainly comparable to theirs and yet he had been able to find the time to study many of the classics. Lǚ Méng therefore devoted himself to serious study, and indeed became so skilled in the material that he could successfully debate classicist scholars.10
Another anecdote preserved in Lǚ Méng’s biography tells that around this time, three officers with garrisons close to Lǚ Méng’s garrison had died, and Sūn Quán wished to add their troops to Lǚ Méng’s own, as the three officers’ junior relatives were considered too young for military command. Lǚ Méng’s sought to decline, arguing that the services of the officers were such that their relatives could not be left dispossessed, and after thrice sending letters declining, Sūn Quán relented and let the junior relatives inherit command, while Lǚ Méng selected teachers to provide education and guidance for them. This anecdote is preserved as an example of Lǚ Méng’s care and concern for others.11
Lǚ Méng then participated in operations in Lùjiāng, and then in the defense against Cáo Cāo’s counter-campaign in 212-213, where Lǚ Méng is credited as repeatedly contributing surprising strategies. Lǚ Méng is also credited as advising Sūn Quán to build docks and fortifications at the mouth of the Rúxū river.12 Most of the officers believed it a pointless labor, remarking that they could simply have troops dismount or board their boats at the shores of the riverbank, but Lǚ Méng warned of the difficulties of maintaining a quick and orderly retreat by boat in such a way if they suffered a setback and were hard pressed by approaching enemy forces. Sūn Quán agreed and ordered the construction of the docks and fortifications.13
Unable to overcome the fortresses at Rúxū, Cáo Cāo was forced to withdraw his main armies, but he left his officer Zhū Guāng appointed as claimant Administrator of Lújiāng, based in a forward position at Wǎn city14 with plans to develop the territory for potential future operations against Sūn Quán, as well as link up with malcontents against Sūn Quán’s regime to stir up trouble in Sūn Quán’s territories. Warning of the serious dangers should Zhū Guāng become well-entrenched in this position, Lǚ Méng urged Sūn Quán to eliminate the threat quickly, so that Sūn Quán personally led a campaign against Wǎn, and called a meeting with his officers to discuss their strategy.15 Most of the officers were in favor of a traditional siege involving the construction of surrounding earthen works and attacking siege engines, but Lǚ Méng instead argued that they did not have the time for this approach: in the same time they spent building their siege lines and engines, the defenders would build up their own defenses, while the seasonal rains that had allowed their ships to transport their armies forward would also dry up, making their return difficult. Instead, Lǚ Méng argued for an all out attack to take the city by storm. Sūn Quán followed this plan.16
At Lǚ Méng’s recommendation, the front most attacking division aimed at scaling the city walls was led by the officer Gān Níng, then with Lǚ Méng leading an elite division following after them. The attack began at dawn, with Lǚ Méng personally beating the signal drums to direct the attack, and by mealtime the city had fallen. A rescue force led by Cáo Cāo’s famed officer Zhāng Liáo had been on its way, but upon hearing that the city had already fallen could only turn back. Lǚ Méng was greatly praised and rewarded for his achievements, appointed as Sūn Quán’s claimant Administrator of Lújiāng, and further bestowed with more troops and horses, garrison farms, and an expanded personal staff.17
After this campaign, Lǚ Méng returned to garrison Xúnyáng, but within the year there was an uprising in Lúlíng to the south. Several other officers had been sent but thus far been unsuccessful, so that Sūn Quán reportedly remarked: “Birds of prey in the hundreds are not as good as one osprey” and sent Lǚ Méng to suppress the rebellion. Lǚ Méng arrived and indeed successfully put down the uprising, executing the leaders and restoring the rest to commoners.18
By this time, Liú Bèi had successfully conquered Yì province and established himself there, and so Sūn Quán insisted that Liú Bèi’s territories in Jīng province should be “returned.” Perhaps unsurprisingly, Liú Bèi refused, leading Sūn Quán to back up his claims with military force, sending Lǚ Méng to seize control over the three southern prefectures of the province. Chángshā and Guìyáng surrendered quickly, but Línglíng under the command of Hǎo Pǔ held out. Liú Bèi personally led an army east station his old headquarters at Gōng’ān and send Guān Yǔ to contest the southern three prefectures. Guān Yǔ’s approach was blocked off by an army commanded by Lǔ Sù, and Sūn Quán sent urgent orders for Lǚ Méng to abandon the siege of Línglíng and quickly return to reinforce Lǔ Sù.
However, when Lǚ Méng received his orders, he kept it secret, and instead made a show of meeting with his officers to plan an attack to take Línglíng city by storm, falsely claiming that Liú Bèi was far away in Hànzhōng under siege by Cáo Cāo’s officer Xiàhóu Yuān and Guān Yǔ was blocked off by Sūn Quán himself, so that Línglíng had no hope for rescue, and sent an envoy to Hǎo Pǔ to share this news and give him one final chance to surrender. Terrified, Hǎo Pǔ went out and surrendered. But as Hǎo Pǔ was led to the boat to take him away, Lǚ Méng showed him the letter he had received ordering his return, and as Hǎo Pǔ read it and learned the true situation, Lǚ Méng roared with laughter.
A new settlement was reached between Liú Bèi and Sūn Quán where the south of Jīng province was divided between them at the Xiāng river, so that Sūn Quán kept Guìyáng and most of Chángshā while Línglíng was returned to Liú Bèi. Nevertheless, Lǚ Méng was rewarded for his successes.19
Soon after this settlement, Sūn Quán turned his attentions back north against Cáo Cāo, personally leading another campaign against Héféi, in which Lǚ Méng participated. The campaign was unsuccessful and Sūn Quán ordered a withdrawal, which led to a near disaster when Sūn Quán sent the bulk of his forces ahead and remained behind in the rearguard: Cáo Cāo’s officer Zhāng Liáo led a sortie out of Héféi in pursuit, catching Sūn Quán’s unit by surprise and very nearly capturing Sūn Quán himself. In the fierce fighting, several officers personally put their lives on the line to defend Sūn Quán, including Lǚ Méng.20
The next year in 216, Cáo Cāo personally led another campaign against Sūn Quán, attacking the fortress at Rúxū. Lǚ Méng was appointed the commander of the defense, occupying the front fortifications with strong crossbow divisions to resist Cáo Cāo’s army, and further attacking and defeating Cáo Cāo’s front most divisions. After this Lǚ Méng’s rank was advanced to a higher miscellaneous title General’s rank as well as appointed Left Protector of the Army.21 (Lǚ Méng’s colleague Jiǎng Qīn appears to have been appointed Right Protector of the Army around this same time.22) The office of Protector of the Army was traditionally very influential and powerful, often involved in central command over military officers and in the selection and appointment of military officers; Zhōu Yú had previously been appointed Central Protector of the Army in order to oversee military affairs after the death of Sūn Cè.23 The designation of Left, aside from dividing authority between a Left and Right, could perhaps also suggest a focus on the eastern front in Yáng province as opposed to the western front in Jīng province, as “Left” and “Right” traditionally had associations of “east” and “west,” respectively.24
In 217, Lǔ Sù, Sūn Quán’s senior commander over the west, died, and as most already know, Lǚ Méng eventually inherited Lǔ Sù’s command. There is another minor anecdote recorded in the biography of the senior officer Yán Jùn that Sūn Quán had originally wished to appoint Yán Jùn as Lǔ Sù’s successor at the western garrison at Lùkǒu. Yán Jùn, though an experienced and long serving officer in Sūn Quán’s own staff, insisted that he was unsuitable for an independent military command (with an attached anecdote that Sūn Quán supposedly once tested Yán Jùn’s riding skills only for Yán Jùn to fall off the saddle while mounting the horse) and fiercely declined.25
In any case, when Lǚ Méng was transferred to take over Lǔ Sù’s former command, he inherited all of Lǔ Sù’s former troops, and further also inherited Lǔ Sù’s claimant office of Administrator of the Hànchāng prefecture26 that formed the main border between Sūn Quán’s and Liú Bèi’s territories in Jīng province. Liú Bèi’s remaining holdings in Jīng province, under the command of Liú Bèi’s officer Guān Yǔ, were upstream of Sūn Quán’s core territories in both Jīng and Yáng provinces and therefore a constant threat. Previously Lǔ Sù had argued in favor of tolerating the situation in order to use Liú Bèi’s and Guān Yǔ’s military strength as a buffer against Cáo Cāo, but Lǚ Méng now argued that their own military power had become sufficiently strong to hold the territory against Cáo Cāo themselves, and the situation with Liú Bèi and Guān Yǔ should no longer be tolerated for long.27 Nevertheless, in order to avoid hostility and suspicion, when Lǚ Méng arrived at Lǔ Sù’s former garrison at Lùkǒu, he increased the cultivation of friendly relations with Guān Yǔ.28
In 219, Guān Yǔ launched a major offensive north against Cáo Cāo’s holdings in northern Jīng province, besieging the strategic city of Fán, but still leaving sizable garrisons at Gōng’ān and Jiānglíng. Lǚ Méng sent messages east to Sūn Quán suggesting that these garrisons remained out of a concern of Lǚ Méng potentially striking from behind, and proposed to Sūn Quán to summon Lǚ Méng back east under the excuse of receiving medical treatment for a recurring illness, in order to bait Guān Yǔ into lowering his guard. Given later events, probably Lǚ Méng really was ill to some degree, but on hearing news of Lǚ Méng’s recall east, Guān Yǔ indeed began to decrease the size of the remaining garrisons to shift strength north to his attack on Fán.29 Meanwhile, Cáo Cāo had sent a relief force under his officer Yú Jīn, but sudden heavy flooding destroyed and isolated Yú Jīn’s armies, forcing him to surrender to Guān Yǔ. With the capture of so many prisoners and with the ongoing siege of Fán, Guān Yǔ’s provisions ran low, and so he seized provisions from granaries from Sūn Quán’s territories in Jīng province.30 Probably this gave Sūn Quán a cassus belli, as well as information on the potentially brittle state of Guān Yǔ’s army and provisions, for when Sūn Quán heard of this he mobilized his forces, sending Lǚ Méng ahead at the front. On reaching his former garrison at Xúnyáng, Lǚ Méng famously prepared an elite force disguised as commoners and merchants, which traveled ahead day and night, and captured all the scouts and watchtowers that Guān Yǔ had stationed along the Jiāng, so that Guān Yǔ remained unaware of their movements. Arriving at Gōng’ān and then Jiānglíng, the defending officers Shí Rén and then Mí Fāng surrendered one after the other.31
During the campaign, Sūn Quán had considered dividing the command into left and right divisions between Lǚ Méng and Sūn Quán’s cousin Sūn Jiǎo. Lǚ Méng however argued that Sūn Quán should choose one or the other in order to avoid the difficulties in coordination in a divided command, citing the previous example of a left and right division between Zhōu Yú and Chéng Pǔ causing difficulties during the 208 Chìbì campaign against Cáo Cāo and 209-210 Jiānglíng campaign against Cáo Rén. Sūn Quán ultimately agreed and appointed Lǚ Méng as the forward commander with Sūn Jiǎo as rear support.32
By taking control over Jiānglíng, Lǚ Méng had captured the families and dependents of Guān Yǔ and his army, but he quickly made a show of caring for them and asking after their needs and forbidding his troops from harming the locals. When one of Lǚ Méng’s own personal banner-men, who was also from Lǚ Méng’s hometown, took a straw hat from a local civilian in order to protect government-owned armor from the rain, Lǚ Méng considered it a violation of the military orders, and though he shed tears he still ordered the soldier’s execution. The army was indeed shaken by this harsh example, so that afterward those in the army did not dare to even pick up abandoned items on the road. Lǚ Méng also made a show of sending his personal intimates out to interview local elders to ask after their needs, distributing medicine to the ill, clothes to the cold, and food to the hungry. Furthermore, all the wealth and valuables in Guān Yǔ’s office and treasury were sealed away to await Sūn Quán’s arrival.33
By this stage, Guān Yǔ’s siege of Fán had been broken by a second relief force under Cáo Cāo’s officer Xǔ Huǎng, and Guān Yǔ also finally began to hear news of the fall of Gōng’ān and Jiānglíng. As Guān Yǔ returned south, he sent envoys ahead to exchange news with Lǚ Méng, and Lǚ Méng made sure to send the envoys about the city to ask after the local families and even pass on handwritten letters. Therefore news quickly spread through Guān Yǔ’s army that their families and dependents were well treated, and it is said that they quickly lost the will to fight. Guān Yǔ realized he was in danger of being isolated and trapped, and so turned to flee west, while his forces largely all surrendered. However, Sūn Quán had sent his officers Zhū Rán and Pān Zhāng ahead to cut off Guān Yǔ’s escape route, so Guān Yǔ was captured and killed, and “Jīng province was therefore settled.”34
Sūn Quán was probably very pleased with the results, and installed Lǚ Méng as Administrator of Nán prefecture, the office previously held by Zhōu Yú when the territory had been under their control, before it was ceded (or “loaned” as Sūn Quán would claim) to Liú Bèi shortly after Zhōu Yú’s death in 210. Sūn Quán also ordered Lǚ Méng enfeoffed with a Marquisate, and further bestowed him with gold and cash; Lǚ Méng’s attempts to decline the gold and cash were not permitted by Sūn Quán. An appended anecdote also tells that Sūn Quán held a great gathering at Gōng’ān, where Sūn Quán had arrived and established his headquarters, in celebration: Lǚ Méng sought to decline citing his illness, but Sūn Quán laughed and insisted, increasing the troops, drummers and trumpeters, and staff personnel in Lǚ Méng’s retinue as a General and as Administrators of both Nán and Lújīang, and after the gathering these followers filled the roads as his escort, drumming and trumpeting ahead and behind him, dazzling and glorifying the road.35
But before the formal enfeoffment bestowals could be applied, Lǚ Méng’s illness broke out again, and Sūn Quán ordered Lǚ Méng transferred to his own palace in Gōng’ān to receive treatment, offering heavy rewards in gold to anyone who could cure Lǚ Méng. Wanting to be constantly aware of Lǚ Méng’s condition but also avoid bothering Lǚ Méng with constant formal visits, Sūn Quán reportedly had a hole put in the wall so that he could check informally at any time, happy and pleased whenever Lǚ Méng’s condition seemed to improve, and anxious and nervous whenever Lǚ Méng’s condition seemed to worsen. Near the end when Lǚ Méng’s condition became especially bad, Sūn Quán reportedly ordered mystics to pray beneath the stars for Lǚ Méng’s life.36
Elsewhere we are told: “Of the illnesses of the meritorious ministers of the beginning of the enterprise, in [Sūn] Quán’s concern, Lǚ Méng and Líng Tǒng were the most serious, [Zhū] Rán next after them.”37
Lǚ Méng died in the early months of 220, aged forty-two in traditional reckoning. Prior to his death, he had ordered the treasures and valuables that he had been bestowed with over the course of his career to be sealed away and returned after his death. It is said that Sūn Quán greatly mourned Lǚ Méng, and hearing of Lǚ Méng’s orders increased his grief further.38 After Lǚ Méng’s death, the marquisate he was to receive was inherited by Lǚ Méng’s sons, along with a grant of three hundred families and fifty qīng of land as revenue to maintain Lǚ Méng’s tomb.
It is said that Lǚ Méng as a youth did not read, so that when discussing great affairs, he would dictate orally. There is a story that Lǚ Méng also was repeatedly reported by another official Cài Yí for issues with Lǚ Méng’s personal retainer troops, but Lǚ Méng did not hold a grudge and instead praised and recommended Cài Yí as a good official. The famed officer Gān Níng, who was notorious for his violent and brutal nature, once famously disappointed and offended Lǚ Méng,39 and later violated Sūn Quán’s orders, but Lǚ Méng nevertheless defended Gān Níng to Sūn Quán, arguing that with the world still in war and chaos, officers like Gān Níng needed to be tolerated and employed.40 There is another anecdote that Lǚ Méng once personally prevented a fight from breaking out between Líng Tǒng and Gān Níng, who had a blood feud.41
Appraisal
In a recorded discussion between Sūn Quán and Lù Xùn concerning Lù Xùn’s three predecessors on the western front, Zhōu Yú, Lǔ Sù, and Lǚ Méng, Sūn Quán stated that when Lǚ Méng was young, Sūn Quán had only considered him courageous and daring and nothing more, but later in life Lǚ Méng had gained learning and developed as an exceptional strategist, second only to Zhōu Yú, only falling short in elegance and skill in verbal argument and commentary. However, in planning and capturing Guān Yǔ, Sūn Quán believed Lǚ Méng to have surpassed Lǔ Sù.42
The canonical appraisal at the end of the biographical entry largely follows similar lines in noting Lǚ Méng’s development:
Lǚ Méng was valorous and yet had strategy and decisiveness, nothing his military plans, deceiving Hǎo Pǔ and capturing Guān Yǔ were his most ingenious. Though at first he was reckless and rashly killed, in the end he overcame himself, having the capacity of a state servicemen; how he was the sort of a military officer and nothing more?43
Of course, though Sūn Quán and others of Wú valued and praised Lǚ Méng, the appraisals of later commentators with their differing sympathies are much harsher:
Lǚ Méng and Lù Xùn are only demons! Even if treacherous plans are able to be enacted, it also is only a temporary outcome, how is it worth glorifying? Do you not see how Méng and Xùn in those years with the grass and trees together rotted and decayed?44
Though Lǚ Méng won, he could not be without punishment; to be close with the traitors to Hàn and enemies with the heirs of Hàn, Méng also had what heart? Thus later people then hated Lǚ, but could not forget and miss Lǔ [Sù] Zǐjìng.45
The reasons for such appraisals should be rather self-explanatory: later commentators sympathetic to the cause of Shǔ-Hàn quite naturally really, really hate the man who dealt Shǔ-Hàn one of its most serious defeats. Even setting aside the mythology assigning the blame of Guān Yǔ’s death to Lǚ Méng, the historiography is still pretty clear about the fact that Lǚ Méng was the primary enemy commander of what was probably one of Shǔ-Hàn’s most serious and humiliating setbacks. So it is perhaps natural that so many later storytellers relish telling the embellished story of Lǚ Méng collapsing with blood pouring out of his “seven apertures” (left eye, right eye, left ear, right ear, left nostril, right nostril, mouth).46
My Appraisal
I find the seething at Lǚ Méng, such as in the two above appraisals, to be rather pointless and arguably based on a faulty reading of the situation. Of course his loyalties were to Sūn Quán and to Wú, and of course he would act in their interests rather than in the interests of Later Hàn or Shǔ-Hàn (which I would still argue were not the same thing, no matter how many commentators of the past eighteen centuries have desperately tried to argue otherwise). The second appraisal above by Cài Dōngfān and its attempt to contrast Lǚ Méng to Lǔ Sù seem particularly flawed given how Lǔ Sù before anyone else, before even Zhōu Yú or Lǚ Méng, was the one who dared encourage Sūn Quán to seek to become the successor to Hàn rather than a savior of Hàn.47
I do admit that I can see the case for Lǚ Méng’s successful “strike from behind” against Guān Yǔ to be considered a “betrayal” of sorts, but I do not see why it should be considered particularly heinous out of all the great “betrayals” of the era.48 Lǚ Méng’s loyalties were to Sūn Quán and not to Liú Bèi. We are even told that Guān Yǔ did not fully commit to his attacks on Fán in the early phases of the campaign because he was concerned at the possibility of Lǚ Méng attacking him from the other side. What caught Guān Yǔ by surprise was the speed by which Lǚ Méng was able to return to the front after leaving it, not the possibility of Lǚ Méng attacking at all. Indeed, Sūn Quán had previously outright made a formal surrender to the Cáo Cāo-controlled Hàn regime in 217,49 and Liú Bèi and Guān Yǔ certainly could not have been unaware of that, nor of its potential implications.
But enough about the controversy and seethe. Talking more broadly about Lǚ Méng and his roles in mythology, he strikes me as a very underappreciated and underutilized character.
One theory I have read about concerning the failure of Wú to capture popular imagination has been the difficulty of finding an appropriate “viewpoint hero” to follow. Sūn Jiān and Sūn Cè both died relatively young, whereas Sūn Quán, though long-lived and personally brave (arguably even reckless), failed to achieve many victories when personally in command.50 Going beyond the ruling family to the main celebrated officers, Zhōu Yú also has the problem of dying relatively young, while Lǔ Sù, who also died rather early in only middle age, suffers from not having as many victories when in personal command celebrated on the scale of the celebration of Zhōu Yú’s command at the Red Cliffs.
If that is the case then, I might recommend Lǚ Méng could be such a “viewpoint hero” for a story following Wú, at least for its early pre-Imperial era. Though he also died only in middle age, he had the good fortune at starting from a young age and therefore covering much of the pre-Imperial period of Wú despite his relatively early death. He served in Sūn Cè’s personal following, and then was one of the promising young officers recognized by Sūn Quán. He rose from relatively low origins as a refugee from the north through the ranks to reach the highest levels of the Wú officers, becoming the effective successor of Zhōu Yú and Lǔ Sù as Sūn Quán’s chief commanding officer over the west. Though dismissed as a violent brute and nothing more, probably particularly for the incident where he murdered a man for insulting him, he later devoted himself to study and managed to gain enough learning and develop his strategic thinking to impress the cultured and higher class Lǔ Sù. Despite not being the longest lived character of the era, Lǚ Méng still has perhaps one of the most dramatic character arcs.
Even his early death could lend itself to a contributing to the emotional power of a story rather than be considered an impediment, if treated as an illustration of the tragedy that was the stories of many of Sūn Quán’s more ambitious early officers. Lǚ Méng’s two famed predecessors Zhōu Yú and Lǔ Sù had both dared speak of and work toward the dream of an Empire with its capital in the south, only to die long before Sūn Quán could make such bold Imperial claims and bestow Imperial-style gifts to his supporters. A story of Lǚ Méng could identify him as the successor to such daring dreams, and as a successor to such tragedies, falling fatally ill right before receiving high rewards of enfeoffment, and perishing before Sūn Quán’s final triumphs. There is also the personal element that Sūn Quán should be a personal witness to the decline and fall. Whereas previously Zhōu Yú and Lǔ Sù had succumbed to illness while on the western front with Sūn Quán away in the east, with Lǚ Méng, Sūn Quán had personally come west to witness his officer’s triumph, but also to personally witness his officer’s downfall, and be completely powerless to stop it.
Personally, I’ve always thought that portrait in the historiography to be much more dramatic and powerful than the “blood pouring from seven apertures” story in the mythology, but maybe I’m just a weirdo since it seems that everyone else loves the seven apertures version.
Anyways, Lǚ Méng had a very dramatic life, and a very dramatic death, and I consider it a great shame that the mythology seems to have never properly utilized it. Seriously, someone needs to write a proper story about him already.
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》呂蒙字子明,汝南富陂人也。少南渡,依姊夫鄧當。當為孫策將,數討山越。蒙年十五六,竊隨當擊賊,當顧見大驚,呵叱不能禁止。歸以告蒙母,母恚欲罰之,蒙曰:「貧賤難可居,脫誤有功,富貴可致。且不探虎穴,安得虎子?」母哀而舍之。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》時當職吏以蒙年小輕之,曰:「彼豎子何能為?此欲以肉餧虎耳。」他日與蒙會,又蚩辱之。蒙大怒,引刀殺吏,出走,逃邑子鄭長家。出因校尉袁雄自首,承間為言,策召見奇之,引置左右。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》數歲,鄧當死,張昭薦蒙代當,拜別部司馬。數歲,鄧當死,張昭薦蒙代當,拜別部司馬。權統事,料諸小將兵少而用薄者,欲并合之。蒙陰賒貰,為兵作絳衣行縢,及簡日,陳列赫然,兵人練習,權見之大恱,增其兵。從討丹楊,所向有功,拜平北都尉,領廣德長。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》從征黃祖,祖令都督陳就逆以水軍出戰。蒙勒前鋒,親梟就首,將士乘勝,進攻其城。祖聞就死,委城走,兵追禽之。權曰:「事之克,由陳就先獲也。」以蒙為橫野中郎將,賜錢千萬。
I previously discussed some parts of this campaign in the articles:
Though not stated in the text, based on the context, my guess is that Xí Sù’s army was part of the military forces sent by Liú Zhāng in answer to Cáo Cāo’s summons for reinforcements from Yì province. Prior to Cáo Cāo’s setbacks at Chìbì, Liú Zhāng had nominally recognized and accepted the Hàn regime controlled by Cáo Cāo. After Cáo Cāo’s defeat, most likely Xí Sù decided to leave Cáo Cāo and surrender to Zhōu Yú.
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》益州將襲肅舉軍來附,瑜表以肅兵益蒙,蒙盛稱肅有膽用,且慕化遠來,於義宜益不宜奪也。權善其言,還肅兵。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》瑜使甘寧前據夷陵,曹仁分衆攻寧,寧困急,使使請救。諸將以兵少不足分,蒙謂瑜、普曰:「留淩公績,蒙與君行,解圍釋急,勢亦不乆,蒙保公績能十日守也。」又說瑜分遣三百人柴斷險道,賊走可得其馬。瑜從之。軍到夷陵,即日交戰,所殺過半。敵夜遁去,行遇柴道,騎皆舍馬步走。兵追蹙擊,獲馬三百匹,方船載還。於是將士形勢自倍,乃渡江立屯,與相攻擊,曹仁退走,遂據南郡,撫定荊州。還,拜偏將軍,領尋陽令。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》魯肅代周瑜,當之陸口,過蒙屯下。肅意尚輕蒙,或說肅曰:「呂將軍功名日顯,不可以故意待也,君宜顧之。」遂往詣蒙。酒酣,蒙問肅曰:「君受重任,與關羽為鄰,將何計略,以備不虞?」肅造次應曰:「臨時施宜。」蒙曰:「今東西雖為一家,而關羽實熊虎也,計安可不豫定?」因為肅畫五策。肅於是越席就之,拊其背曰:「呂子明,吾不知卿才略所及乃至於此也。」遂拜蒙母,結友而別。
《三國志注·吳書九·呂蒙傳》江表傳曰:初,權謂蒙及蔣欽曰:「卿今並當塗掌事,宜學問以自開益。」蒙曰:「在軍中常苦多務,恐不容復讀書。」權曰:「孤豈欲卿治經為博士邪?但當令涉獵見往事耳。卿言多務孰若孤,孤少時歷詩、書、禮記、左傳、國語,惟不讀易。至統事以來,省三史、諸家兵書,自以為大有所益。如卿二人,意性朗悟,學必得之,寧當不為乎?宜急讀孫子、六韜、左傳、國語及三史。孔子言『終日不食,終夜不寢以思,無益,不如學也』。光武當兵馬之務,手不釋卷。孟德亦自謂老而好學。卿何獨不自勉勗邪?」蒙始就學,篤志不倦,其所覽見,舊儒不勝。後魯肅上代周瑜,過蒙言議,常欲受屈。肅拊蒙背曰:「吾謂大弟但有武略耳,至於今者,學識英博,非復吳下阿蒙。」蒙曰:「士別三日,即更刮目相待。大兄今論,何一稱穰侯乎。兄今代公瑾,旣難為繼,且與關羽為鄰。斯人長而好學,讀左傳略皆上口,梗亮有雄氣,然性頗自負,好陵人。今與為對,當有單複以鄉待之。」。密為肅陳三策,肅敬受之,祕而不宣。權常歎曰:「人長而進益,如呂蒙、蔣欽,蓋不可及也。富貴榮顯,更能折節好學,耽恱書傳,輕財尚義,所行可迹,並作國士,不亦休乎!」
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》時蒙與成當、宋定、徐顧屯次比近,三將死,子弟幼弱,權悉以兵并蒙。蒙固辭,陳啟顧等皆勤勞國事,子弟雖小,不可廢也。書三上,權乃聽。蒙於是又為擇師,使輔導之,其操心率如此。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》魏使廬江謝奇為蘄春典農,屯皖田鄉,數為邊寇。蒙使人誘之,不從,則伺隙襲擊,奇遂縮退,其部伍孫子才、宋豪等,皆攜負老弱,詣蒙降。後從權拒曹公於濡須,數進奇計,又勸權夾水口立塢,所以備御甚精,曹公不能下而退。
《三國志注·吳書九·呂蒙傳》吳錄曰:權欲作塢,諸將皆曰:「上岸擊賊,洗足入船,何用塢為?」呂蒙曰:「兵有利鈍,戰無百勝,如有邂逅,敵步騎蹙人,不暇及水,其得入船乎?」權曰:「善。」遂作之。
Also popularly known by the alternative reading of the character 皖 Huán in the amateur circles in order to avoid confusion with the Wǎn 宛 city further west in Nányáng.
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》曹公遣朱光為廬江太守,屯皖,大開稻田,又令間人招誘鄱陽賊帥,使作內應。蒙曰:「皖田肥美,若一收孰,彼衆必增,如是數歲,操態見矣,宜早除之。」乃具陳其狀。於是權親征皖,引見諸將,問以計策。
《三國志注·吳書九·呂蒙傳》吳書曰:諸將皆勸作土山,添攻具,蒙趨進曰:「治攻具及土山,必歷日乃成,城備旣脩,外救必至,不可圖也。且乘雨水以入,若留經日,水必向盡,還道艱難,蒙竊危之。今觀此城,不能甚固,以三軍銳氣,四面並攻,不移時可拔,及水以歸,全勝之道也。」權從之。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》蒙乃薦甘寧為升城督,督攻在前,蒙以精銳繼之。侵晨進攻,蒙手執枹鼓,士卒皆騰踊自升,食時破之。旣而張遼至夾石,聞城已拔,乃退。權嘉其功,即拜廬江太守,所得人馬皆分與之,別賜尋陽屯田六百戶,官屬三十人。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》蒙還尋陽,未期而廬陵賊起,諸將討擊不能禽,權曰:「鷙鳥累百,不如一鶚。」復令蒙討之。蒙至,誅其首惡,餘皆釋放,復為平民。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》是時劉備令關羽鎮守,專有荊土,權命蒙西取長沙、零、桂三郡。蒙移書二郡,望風歸服,惟零陵太守郝普城守不降。而備自蜀親至公安,遣羽爭三郡。權時住陸口,使魯肅將萬人屯益陽拒羽,而飛書召蒙,使捨零陵,急還助肅。初,蒙旣定長沙,當之零陵,過酃,載南陽鄧玄之,玄之者郝普之舊也,欲令誘普。及被書當還,蒙祕之,夜召諸將,授以方略,晨當攻城,顧謂玄之曰:「郝子太聞世間有忠義事,亦欲為之,而不知時也。左將軍在漢中,為夏侯淵所圍。關羽在南郡,今至尊身自臨之。近者破樊本屯,救酃,逆為孫規所破。此皆目前之事,君所親見也。彼方首尾倒縣,救死不給,豈有餘力復營此哉?今吾士卒精銳,人思致命,至尊遣兵,相繼於道。今予以旦夕之命,待不可望之救,猶牛蹄中魚,兾賴江漢,其不可恃亦明矣。若子太必能一士卒之心,保孤城之守,尚能稽延旦夕,以待所歸者,可也。今吾計力度慮,而以攻此,曾不移日,而城必破,城破之後,身死何益於事,而令百歲老母戴白受誅,豈不痛哉?度此家不得外問,謂援可恃,故至於此耳。君可見之,為陳禍福。」玄之見普,具宣蒙意,普懼而聽之。玄之先出報蒙,普尋後當至。蒙豫勑四將,各選百人,普出,便入守城門。須臾普出,蒙迎執其手,與俱下船。語畢,出書示之,因拊手大笑,普見書,知備在公安,而羽在益陽,慙恨入地。蒙留孫河委以後事。即日引軍赴益陽。劉備請盟,權乃歸普等,割湘水,以零陵還之。以尋陽、陽新為蒙奉邑。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》師還,遂征合肥,旣徹兵,為張遼等所襲,蒙與淩統以死扞衞。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》後曹公又大出濡須,權以蒙為督,據前所立塢,置彊弩萬張於其上,以拒曹公。曹公前鋒屯未就,蒙攻破之,曹公引退。拜蒙左護軍、虎威將軍。
《三國志·吳書十·蔣欽傳》從征合肥,魏將張遼襲權於津北,欽力戰有功,遷盪寇將軍,領濡須督。後召還都,拜津右護軍,典領辭訟。
《三國志·吳書九·周瑜傳》五年,策薨,權統事。瑜將兵赴喪,遂留吳,以中護軍與長史張昭共掌衆事。
Traditionally, a ruler faces south when holding court, placing east on the left and west on the right. As further evidence of the east-left and west-right associations for Wú’s appointments specifically, note the 229 appointments of Zhū Rán as Right Protector of the Army and claimant Governor of Yǎn province and of Quán Cóng as Left Protector of the Army and claimant Governor of Xú province; Yǎn is further west and north of Jīng province, Xú is further east and north of Yáng province.
《三國志·吳書八·嚴畯傳》及橫江將軍魯肅卒,權以畯代肅,督兵萬人,鎮據陸口。衆人咸為畯喜,畯前後固辭:「樸素書生,不閑軍事,非才而據,咎悔必至。」發言慷慨,至于流涕,權乃聽焉。世嘉其能以實讓。
《三國志注·吳書八·嚴畯傳》志林曰:權又試畯騎,上馬墮鞍。
Though certainly not very often, I have seen the odd “wild conspiracy theory” every now and then interpreting this Yán Jùn anecdote as evidence that Sūn Quán did not trust in Lǚ Méng. This certainly need not be the case. Another “wild conspiracy theory” could be that, seeing as Lǚ Méng had just earlier been given a powerful office associated with the east, Left Protector of the Army, perhaps Sūn Quán had wished to keep Lǚ Méng on the eastern front instead of transferring him to the western front. But of course that is just another speculative conspiracy theory that most certainly should not be taken seriously.
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》魯肅卒,蒙西屯陸口,肅軍人馬萬餘盡以屬蒙。又拜漢昌太守,食下雋、劉陽、漢昌、州陵。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》與關羽分土接境,知羽驍雄,有并兼心,且居國上流,其勢難乆。初,魯肅等以為曹公尚存,禍難始搆,宜相輔協,與之同仇,不可失也,蒙乃密陳計策曰:「令征虜守南郡,潘璋住白帝,蔣欽將游兵萬人,循江上下,應敵所在,蒙為國家前據襄陽,如此,何憂於操,何賴於羽?且羽君臣,矜其詐力,所在反覆,不可以腹心待也。今羽所以未便東向者,以至尊聖明,蒙等尚存也。今不於彊壯時圖之,一旦僵仆,欲復陳力,其可得邪?」權深納其策,又聊復與論取徐州意,蒙對曰:「今操遠在河北,新破諸袁,撫集幽、兾,未暇東顧。徐土守兵,聞不足言,往自可克。然地勢陸通,驍騎所騁,至尊今日得徐州,操後旬必來爭,雖以七八萬人守之,猶當懷憂。不如取羽,全據長江,形勢益張。」權尤以此言為當。
As has been noted by numerous commentators in the past, the arguments attributed to Lǚ Méng here contain several serious anachronisms, suggesting they may be a corrupted misconstruction using misplaced quotations, or perhaps even an outright invented construction by a later writer or historian.
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》及蒙代肅,初至陸口,外倍脩恩厚,與羽結好。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》後羽討樊,留兵將備公安、南郡。蒙上疏曰:「羽討樊而多留備兵,必恐蒙圖其後故也。蒙常有病,乞分士衆還建業,以治疾為名。羽聞之,必撤備兵,盡赴襄陽。大軍浮江,晝夜馳上,襲其空虛,則南郡可下,而羽可禽也。」遂稱病篤,權乃露檄召蒙還,陰與圖計。羽果信之,稍撤兵以赴樊。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》魏使于禁救樊,羽盡禽禁等,人馬數萬,託以糧乏,擅取湘關米。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》權聞之,遂行,先遣蒙在前。蒙至尋陽,盡伏其精兵𦩷𦪇中,使白衣搖櫓,作商賈人服,晝夜兼行,至羽所置江邊屯候,盡收縛之,是故羽不聞知。遂到南郡,士仁、麋芳皆降。
《三國志·吳書六·孫皎傳》後呂蒙當襲南郡,權欲令皎與蒙為左右部大督,蒙說權曰:「若至尊以征虜能,宜用之;以蒙能,宜用蒙。昔周瑜、程普為左右部督,共攻江陵,雖事決於瑜,普自恃乆將,且俱是督,遂共不睦,幾敗國事,此目前之戒也。」權寤,謝蒙曰:「以卿為大督,命皎為後繼。」
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》蒙入據城,盡得羽及將士家屬,皆撫慰,約令軍中不得干歷人家,有所求取。蒙麾下士,是汝南人,取民家一笠,以覆官鎧,官鎧雖公,蒙猶以為犯軍令,不可以鄉里故而廢法,遂垂涕斬之。於是軍中震慄,道不拾遺。蒙旦暮使親近存恤耆老,問所不足,疾病者給醫藥,饑寒者賜衣糧。羽府藏財寶,皆封閉以待權至。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》羽還,在道路,數使人與蒙相聞,蒙輒厚遇其使,周游城中,家家致問,或手書示信。羽人還,私相參訊,咸知家門無恙,見待過於平時,故羽吏士無鬬心。會權尋至,羽自知孤窮,乃走麥城,西至漳鄉,衆皆委羽而降。權使朱然、潘璋斷其徑路,即父子俱獲,荊州遂定。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》以蒙為南郡太守,封孱陵侯,賜錢一億,黃金五百斤。蒙固辭金錢,權不許。
《三國志注·吳書八·嚴畯傳》江表傳曰:權於公安大會,呂蒙以疾辭,權笑曰:「禽羽之功,子明謀也,今大功已捷,慶賞未行,豈邑邑邪?」乃增給步騎鼓吹,勑選虎威將軍官屬,并南郡、廬江二郡威儀。拜畢還營,兵馬導從,前後鼓吹,光耀于路。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》封爵未下,會蒙疾發,權時在公安,迎置內殿,所以治護者萬方,募封內有能愈蒙疾者,賜千金。時有鍼加,權為之慘慼,欲數見其顏色,又恐勞動,常穿壁瞻之,見小能下食則喜,顧左右言笑,不然則咄唶,夜不能寐。病中瘳,為下赦令,羣臣畢賀。後更增篤,權自臨視,命道士於星辰下為之請命。年四十二,遂卒於內殿。時權哀痛甚,為之降損。蒙未死時,所得金寶諸賜盡付府藏,勑主者命絕之日皆上還,喪事務約。權聞之,益以悲感。
《三國志·吳書十一·朱然傳》自創業功臣疾病,權意之所鍾,呂蒙、凌統最重,然其次矣。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》年四十二,遂卒於內殿。時權哀痛甚,為之降損。蒙未死時,所得金寶諸賜盡付府藏,勑主者命絕之日皆上還,喪事務約。權聞之,益以悲感。
The anecdote should be saved for a discussion of Gān Níng.
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》蒙少不脩書傳,每陳大事,常口占為牋疏。常以部曲事為江夏太守蔡遺所白,蒙無恨意。及豫章太守顧邵卒,權問所用,蒙因薦遺奉職佳吏,權笑曰:「君欲為祁奚耶?」於是用之。甘寧麤暴好殺,旣常失蒙意,又時違權令,權怒之,蒙輒陳請:「天下未定,鬬將如寧難得,宜容忍之。」權遂厚寧,卒得其用。
《三國志注·吳書十·甘寧傳》吳書曰:凌統怨寧殺其父操,寧常備統,不與相見。權亦命統不得讎之。甞於呂蒙舍會,酒酣,統乃以刀舞。寧起曰:「寧能雙戟舞。」蒙曰:「寧雖能,未若蒙之巧也。」因操刀持楯,以身分之。後權知統意,因令寧將兵,遂徙屯於半州。
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》孫權與陸遜論周瑜、魯肅及蒙曰:「公瑾雄烈,膽略兼人,遂破孟德,開拓荊州,邈焉難繼,君今繼之。公瑾昔要子敬來東,致達於孤,孤與宴語,便及大略帝王之業,此一快也。後孟德因獲劉琮之勢,張言方率數十萬衆水步俱下。孤普請諸將,咨問所宜,無適先對,至子布、文表,俱言宜遣使脩檄迎之,子敬即駮言不可,勸孤急呼公瑾,付任以衆,逆而擊之,此二快也。且其決計策,意出張蘇遠矣;後雖勸吾借玄德地,是其一短,不足以損其二長也。周公不求備於一人,故孤忘其短而貴其長,常以比方鄧禹也。又子明少時,孤謂不辭劇易,果敢有膽而已;及身長大,學問開益,籌略奇至,可以次於公瑾,但言議英發不及之耳。圖取關羽,勝於子敬。子敬荅孤書云:『帝王之起,皆有驅除,羽不足忌。』此子敬內不能辨,外為大言耳,孤亦恕之,不苟責也。然其作軍,屯營不失,令行禁止,部界無廢負,路無拾遺,其法亦美也。」
《三國志·吳書九·呂蒙傳》呂蒙勇而有謀斷,識軍計,譎郝普,禽關羽,最其妙者。初雖輕果妄殺,終於克己,有國士之量,豈徒武將而已乎!
李贄《三國演義》呂蒙、陸遜妖魔耳!縱然奸計得行,亦一時勝負,何足夸戰?汝不見蒙與遜與當年草木同朽腐矣!
蔡東藩《後漢演義》呂蒙雖勝,不能無罪﹔親漢賊而仇漢裔,蒙亦何心?此後人之所以深嫉呂,而不能忘懷於魯子敬也。
https://dict.revised.moe.edu.tw/dictView.jsp?ID=98152
For Lǔ Sù’s blatantly seditious comments against Hàn and my thoughts on that subject, see the article linked in note 5 above.
One hardly ever sees anyone ever criticize Liú Bèi’s “betrayal” of Cáo Cāo in late 199-early 200, for example, despite that one arguably being a much more “clear-cut” betrayal. Given Cáo Cāo’s sponsorship of Liú Bèi and reportedly close trust in him at that time, Cáo Cāo had much more reason to feel betrayed by Liú Bèi in 200 than Liú Bèi or Guān Yǔ did in 219 by Lǚ Méng’s actions.
《三國志·吳書二·吳主傳》二十二年春,權令都尉徐詳詣曹公請降,公報使脩好,誓重結婚。
This argument appears for example in Rafe de Crespigny’s Imperial Warlord.
Lu Meng's signature victory indeed seems lacking, from a storytelling perspective. Zhou Yu faced down and destroyed Cao Cao's gigantic fleet. Guan Yu boldly rode into the middle of Yan Liang's army and took his head. Zhang Liao ripped apart the armies of Wu and nearly captured Sun Quan. Cao Cao has more signature victories than you can count – riding into the far north in the dead of winter and annihilating the Wuhuan perhaps being his most impressive, even over Guandu. In all these instances, the leading generals boldly fought their opponents on a level field, placing themselves at great personal risk, and conquered through courage and cunning.
No doubt Meng was a self-made man, and a top notch general. Certainly his defeat of Guan Yu was fair, as far as the art of war is concerned (Sun Tzu probably would've loved Meng's conquest of Jingzhou). It was a brilliant stroke done in service of his lord, and he was right to do it. It was his duty.
But his crowning victory offends later readers' senses of honor and fair play, and it's simply not the stuff legends are made of. To be blunt: Slipping in behind a helpless enemy who has already been vanquished by another foe and sticking a dagger in his back simply can't compare to the examples of personal valor (Meng was never in any danger) and audacity I mentioned above, no matter how well it was executed. It can hardly inspire later men's hearts and imaginations. It reads more like kicking a great man while he's down, rather than having the guts to deal with him face-to-face.
I'm not saying Meng was wrong to do what he did (as Zhuge Liang says in the novel, Guan Yu was really destroyed by his own arrogance). I'm just saying life, and the way we see and remember people, simply isn't fair.
Another thought: Guan Yu's final campaign is absolutely mystifying to me. One of the strangest things to happen in the Three Kingdoms saga. Why on earth would he launch a campaign from the most vulnerable and far afield section of his lords realm, instead of defending what he had? His corner of Jingzhou lacked the natural defenses of Shu. Most of Shu's top military talent was elsewhere. He had to contend with two extremely dangerous enemies on his border, rather than one. IIRC, he realized when he set out that he was growing old, and even predicted his own death before the start of the campaign. Maybe I could understand his expedition it if it was launched in concert against Wei with a force from Hanzhong, but going it alone? Why didn't Liu Bei or Zhuge Liang put a stop to it?