So some of you have been asking, “Why are you so biased for Wèi and against Jìn? Weren’t they both usurpers?”
Okay, none of you have actually been asking me that. Either I’m not quite popular/controversial enough for comments like that, or my current audience is a bit more sophisticated than certain unnamed Internet circles where “you’re biased” gets thrown around far too often. I hope it’s the latter.
But while we’re on the subject, let’s talk a bit more about the standard narrative for perhaps the last eight or nine centuries or so, which has been to view Sīmǎ Yì’s treason to Wèi as karmic retribution for Cáo Cāo’s treason to Hàn. “What goes around comes around” and such.
I’m sorry, I don’t seem to recall Cáo Cāo ever deposing or killing an Emperor.
Actually, I’m being somewhat disingenuous here, and no, not about how Cáo Cāo actually did do some rather harsh things to the Hàn Emperor and his following (Cāo merely understood precedent well enough to know where the line was). See, the differences in what happened during the Hàn-Wèi and Wèi-Jìn transitions are actually not used as evidence of difference between the situations behind Wèi and Jìn, but rather cited by the commentators who want to equate the Wèi and Jìn situations. How? Well, the idea is that when it “comes around” the next time, it comes back worse. Here, have Míng dynasty scholar Lǐ Zhì’s (1527–1602) comment while reading the Sānguó zhì Yǎnyì, where he celebrates the regicide of the Wèi Emperor, the Duke of Gāoguì xiāng:
Compared to the previous situation of [Cáo] Cāo it is even more severe; it pleases the heart, pleases the heart!1
Let’s set aside the obvious problems in trying to turn “he sends one of yours to the hospital, you send one of his to the morgue”2 into a moral philosophy, since even if you were to accept that as a given, it still wouldn’t really work because Jìn was a contributor to the fall of Hàn: if I punch someone in the face after my friend helps hold that person down, and later my friend breaks my arm, my friend can’t very well say what he did to me was righteous punishment for punching the person that he helped me punch.
The whole idea of righteous karmic retribution falls apart because of the time frames involved. Surely the moralists would be calling me crazy if I were to ever claim that Wèi’s rise was retribution for Hàn's predecessor Qín after a four hundred year gap. It is perhaps worth mentioning that in the 1300s, the heterogeneous compilation of “Three Kingdoms” stories Sānguó zhì Pínghuà actually did try to apply the idea of righteous punishment on Hàn by including a portrayal of Cáo Cāo, Liú Bèi, and Sūn Quán as reincarnations of Hán Xìn, Péng Yuè, and Yīng Bù, three officers who had served Hàn Founder Liú Bāng but who had all later been killed by him.3 Obviously, that idea never really caught on, and was subsequently dropped in later iterations on “Three Kingdoms” mythology compilations.
Back to the topic at hand: The standard narrative is wrong. The Hàn-Wèi and Wèi-Jìn transitions were not the same, on a very fundamental level. The claims of some righteous punishment is based on interpretation of very superficial similarities that ignore the deep differences. I think I used a previous metaphor of a bird and a bat. They may both fly, but they are very different things, and trying to equate the two is foolishness.
I’m looking at you, Shí Lè.4
Zhào Yì’s Argument
Not just me saying it. Qīng dynasty era scholar Zhào Yì (1727-1814) wrote an essay on the subject.5 While I can’t exactly prove it, I’m still going to claim that I came to pretty much the same conclusions on my own first, and then finding Zhào Yì’s essay just confirmed my opinions.
Anyways, Zhào Yì’s essay is very good, so let’s not re-invent the wheel and just straight up quote his argument:
Cáo's replacement of Hàn and the Sīmǎ clan's replacement of Wèi, though their legacies were similar, yet their power had their differences.
From since after Cáo Cāo defeated Yuán Shàng, he resided at Yè, while the capital of Heaven’s Son was at Xǔchāng, only leaving Chief Clerks Guó Yuān, Wáng Bì, and others, one after another handling the Chancellor’s Office affairs. At that time Emperor Xiàn was already thirty to forty years old, and one could not, like for child ruler, be without apprehensions. However, in all the employment of people and enacting of government, raising forces and going on campaign, all these came from Yè sending out orders, and none dared have ulterior intentions. The Sīmǎ clan were regents over Wèi, and then were always personally in the Chancellor’s Office, with the Wèi Emperor together at Luòyáng. It did not matter that [Sīmǎ] Yì’s control of the government was not for a long time, by the time of the brothers [Sīmǎ] Shī and [Sīmǎ] Zhāo, great power was already in their hands, and moreover the Prince of Qí [Cáo] Fāng, Duke of Gāoguì xiàng [Cáo] Máo, Duke of Chángdào xiàng [Cáo] Huàn all in childhood succeeded the throne, so it would appear that they did not need to have been on guard. However when [Sīmǎ] Shī suppressed Guànqiū Jiǎn, he left [Sīmǎ] Zhāo to defend Luòyáng, and when he was critically ill, [Sīmǎ] Zhāo only then went to the army. When [Sīmǎ] Shī died, the Wèi Emperor [Cáo Máo] ordered [Sīmǎ] Zhāo to command troops to defend Xǔchāng, [Sīmǎ] Zhāo however led the troops to return to Luò[yáng] not daring to be far away below Xǔ[chāng]. When Zhūgě Dàn raised troops, [Sīmǎ] Zhāo wished to send officers but then feared they could not be trusted, but if he personally went he also feared the capital would have a coup, and therefore he had the Imperial Dowager Empress and the Duke of Gāoguì xiàng go together with the army. Thus one can see that they did not dare leave the city for even a day.
I will try to suggest a reason.
[Cáo] Cāo, just after the Hàn House was broken, raised righteous troops, put down violent chaos, of Hàn’s subjects like Yuán Shào, Lǚ Bù, Liú Biǎo, Táo Qiān, and others who were able to be a match for [Cáo] Cāo, many were personally by him cut down and pacified, some dying and some executed. Those at Court were not more than those like Yáng Biāo and Kǒng Róng and others, a few civil officials, and also were deposed or killed. The remaining lords and commanders were all promoted and employed by [Cáo] Cāo. Though previously there were Dǒng Chéng, Wáng Zǐfú, Wú Zǐlán, Zhǒng Jí, Wú Shuò, and later there were Wěi Huǎng, Gěng Jì, Jīn Yī, who wished to rectify Hàn and harm [Cáo] Cāo, yet all were without military authority, and on moving were immediately exterminated. Therefore [Cáo Cāo] could securely sit in Yè city, and yet have the Court governance all come from himself.
The Sīmǎ clan then at the time of Emperor Wén [Cáo Pī] and Emperor Míng [Cáo Ruì] when the state’s power was flourishing, suddenly encountered a young ruler succeeding the throne, and were able to steal power. Thus at the time inside and outside the ministers and workers were still all people the Wèi Emperors had employed. Inside there was Zhāng Qī, Sū Shuò, Yuè Dūn, Liú Xián and others, watching for an opportunity to plot against them; outside there was Wáng Líng, Guànqiū Jiǎn, Zhūgě Dàn and others, in succession raising troops, denouncing the Sīmǎ clan. Only by relying on seizing Heaven’s Son could they indulge their treachery. As soon as they left the capital and emperor, then the disaster would be unfathomable. Therefore the father and sons of three people grasped the state’s handle, not daring to go out the gates a single step. It also was the situation making it so.6
I left out the last few concluding sentences, but I’ll come back to in a bit, after expanding a little on exactly what Zhào Yì was getting at.
Sources of Legitimacy
The differences between the situations of Cáo Cāo and the three Sīmǎ really come down to how they obtained their legitimacy.
Qín and Hàn legitimacy came from conquest
Wait, Qín and Hàn? Yes, I’m going to digress to briefly talk about them, because they help provide additional context that helps further illustrate how Wèi and Jìn were different. Qín and Hàn were, after all, the big historical precedents that the thinkers of Wèi and Jìn looked toward while they pondered the question of political legitimacy.
Qín’s claim to legitimacy is straightforward for most people. Though Qín itself seems to have taken steps that could be interpreted claiming direct succession to Zhōu even before destroying their rivals (namely, taking Zhōu’s Regalia and taking custody of the descendants of the Zhōu ruing house),7 Qín’s legitimacy was really finalized when Qín Shǐ Huángdì united the realm, whereupon he first created the title Huángdì “Imperial Emperor” that would be used by all those that followed.8
After Qín’s collapse, the realm was divided by the most powerful rebel leader Xiàng Jí, a General of a restored Chǔ state. Xiàng Jí then promoted the King of Chǔ to Yìdì “Honorary Emperor” (not Huángdì, however, so most people have tended to not count this guy) in order to be able to install himself as the High-King of Western Chǔ and eighteen other powerful rebel leaders into Kings of other divisions of the empire. However, soon after this, Xiàng Jí had the Honorary Emperor killed, which proved a disastrous political move as the King of Hàn, Liú Bāng, seized on the opportunity to make a show of formal mourning for the late Honorary Emperor. This allowed himself to portray his cause against Xiàng Jí as righteous vengeance for the fallen Chǔ Honorary Emperor. Yet after destroying Xiàng Jí and uniting the realm under his own banner, Liú Bāng himself eventually rose to claim the former “Huángdì” title created Qín, thus becoming the Emperor of Hàn.
Consider and compare these two formal statements:
The Great King rose from the minute, put down violent rebellion, pacifying the Four Seas, for those with achievement you split land to enfeoff as kings and lords. If the Great King does not take an Honored Title, all will be suspicious. We your servants to the death assure this.9
With my minute self I raised troops to put down violent chaos, relying on the spirits of the Ancestral Temples, Six Kings all conceded their crimes, and all Under Heaven was greatly settled. Now if our title is not changed, there will be nothing by which to declare the achievement and pass it down to later ages. Therefore discuss an Emperor title.10
The second is the statement by Qín Shǐ Huángdì that led to the creation of the title Huángdì, the first is the petition to Liú Bāng to take title as Hàn’s Huángdì. Note the similarity in the claims. Both Qín and Hàn legitimacy came from the military achievements of conquering the empire.
Wèi legitimacy also came from conquest
The literati of the Southern Dynasties period understood this much at least, as evidenced in how they would speak of “Hàn Gāo [Liú Bāng] and Wèi Wǔ [Cáo Cāo]” together in the same sentence.11 Just as Liú Bāng built the legitimacy of Hàn by right of conquest of the empire after the downfall of Qín (and Chǔ), so too did Cáo Cāo build his own legitimacy through thirty years of military campaigns. Having the Hàn Emperor in his custody was secondary.
The irony for Cáo Cāo is that taking custody of the Hàn Emperor probably ended up being politically damaging in the long run. Being the protector of Hàn necessarily meant he could not become Hàn’s successor without being considered a traitor to Hàn. Having the descendants of Zhōu in their custody did not exactly help Qín’s case in the eyes of later moralists either.
This is a good argument that, in 196 at least, Cáo Cāo probably did not have any real Imperial ambitions in mind quite yet. When Yuán Shào turned down the opportunity to take custody of the Hàn Court, he was perhaps thinking of the example of Liú Bāng, who did nothing to rescue the Chǔ Honorary Emperor but took political advantage of the Honorary Emperor’s death. With luck, the Hàn Emperor would come to a bad end while Yuán Shào himself built up his real power, allowing Yuán Shào to portray himself as Hàn’s righteous avenger (and eventual successor), as Liú Bāng had portrayed himself as the Honorary Emperor’s avenger during his war against Xiàng Jí. Shào was probably not expecting Cáo Cāo to go so far as to take custody of the Hàn Emperor and act the part of Hàn’s defender.
Perhaps Cáo Cāo was a traitor to Hàn, but then he was a different sort of traitor than his predecessors and his immediate successors. Hàn had already been in obvious decline for nearly a century before the traumatic collapse of Imperial authority in 190, with the Hàn Emperor living in destitution by the time he entered Cáo Cāo’s custody in 196. Cáo Cāo was not like the rebel leader Xiàng Jí who destroyed Qín, or even like the Kings of Qín who had formally abolished the Zhōu state while taking custody of the Zhōu ruling house’s descendants. Setting aside the cynical arguments that he was making such moves purely for his own selfish motives, the bare facts remain that Cáo Cāo was not the one who had broken Hàn Imperial authority in 190, and after taking custody of the Court in 196, he did not kill or depose the Hàn Emperor, and further worked to preserve at least the formal appearances of Hàn rule. Even if he only acted for his own benefits, he was still of a very different sort than the previous overly powerful regents of Hàn of the past hundred years; he was no Dǒng Zhuó, Hé Jìn, Dòu Wǔ, or Liáng Jì.
Consider the formal statement issued when Cáo Cāo first received enfeoffment as Duke of Wèi (it’s quite long-winded, so I’ll cut it down a bit):
In the past when Dǒng Zhuó first caused the state disaster, […], you then gathered forces and advanced […].
Later when the Huángjīn rebelled […] you again cut them down to give peace to the eastern plains, and this also was your achievement.
Hán Xiān and Yáng Fèng seized power, you then came to suppress them […] and this also was your achievement.
Yuán Shù usurped and rebelled […], your power and prestige overran the south, and so Shù fell and collapsed, and this also was your achievement.
Turning spears for an eastern campaign, Lǚ Bù at once was slain, and during the ride back to return, Zhāng Yáng was killed, Suī Gù was punished, Zhāng Xiù bowed in submission, and this also was your achievement.
Yuán Shào rebelled […] reaching to the end at Guāndù, you greatly annihilated the villains, allow our country to be rescued from danger and collapse, and this also was your achievement.
Leading armies across the vast Hé, seizing and settling four provinces, Yuán Tán and Gāo Gàn both lost their heads, sea pirates ran and fled, the Hēishān submitted, and this also was your achievement.
The Wūhuán of three tribes esteemed chaos for two generations, Yuán Shàng because of them terrorized and occupied the border passes' north, but you gathered horses and chariots, in one campaign destroyed them, and this also was your achievement.
Liú Biǎo turned his back on his origins, not sending tribute or service, the Ruler's Army you headed on the road, before your authority he first died, a hundred cities and eight prefectures joined arms and bent knees, and this also was your achievement.
Mǎ Chāo and Chéng Yí […] occupied the Hé and Tóng, […] but you destroyed them at the Wèi's south […] and this also was your achievement.
[…]
You have the achievement of settling the realm Under Heaven […].12
Sorry, I know that was rather long-winded even after all the cuts. The point, however, is that the statement is a long list of military conquest achievements.
I suspect the quotations of the Qín and Hàn statements were probably actually cut down versions from similarly long-winded statements. I know the Qín one definitely is, because I myself cut it down even further from the source text; the full quote in the historiography actually goes through the list of the Six defeated Kings. Unfortunately, the Wèi statement isn’t as easily cut down as the Qín statement, since such disparate enemies given in the long list above are not as easily summarized in a single phrase as “Six Kings.”
That was why Cáo Cāo could sit separately in Yè and govern from there. Hàn had already fallen apart, the powerful splitting off with no real practical loyalty to Hàn, leaving only a few relatively weak supporters at Xǔ, so that Cáo Cāo could delegate the task of watching those remaining loyalists at Court to others. Cáo Cāo’s real power came from his army, his real legitimacy from military conquest. The foundations of Wèi were being built up in the same sort as for Qín and Hàn, only Cáo Cāo failed to finish the job in his own lifetime, unlike his predecessors.
Jìn legitimacy came from political usurpation
The foundations of Jìn legitimacy were laid down not by right of conquest, but by political usurpation. No, the conquest of Yān, Shǔ-Hàn, and Wú don't count, at least for what I’m talking about here. The conquest of Shǔ-Hàn and Wú were how Jìn justified and gained legitimacy retro-actively, especially the conquest of Wú, which occurred nearly fifteen years after Jìn actually claimed the Mandate.
No, at the time when the founders of Jìn were actually on the ground getting their hands dirty (figuratively), decades before legitimacy was actually finalized by the conquest of Wú, they were claiming legitimacy through entirely different means: political treachery.
When Sīmǎ Yì killed Cáo Shuǎng, he did not cite his conquest of Yān in Liáodōng as the source of his authority, he cited the political authority that the Emperor Míng, Cáo Ruì, had previously given him. This was what Sīmǎ Yì wrote in his petition to the Emperor Cáo Fāng:
The Former Emperor gave Imperial Order on Your Majesty and the Prince of Qín and your servant to ascend to the imperial bed, and he grabbed your servant’s arm, deeply worrying about later affairs.13
By phrasing things in such terms, Sīmǎ Yì and his successors were able to create ambiguity in how they presented their intentions: were they seeking to usurp Wèi, or were they limiting themselves to only becoming overly powerful regents, in the vein of past figures such as Huò Guāng and Liáng Jì, who had controlled Hàn without actually overthrowing it. The ambiguity was the point: if they moved too quickly and were too obvious in their intentions to usurp Wèi, then the loyalists would have rallied together to oppose it, even with the Sīmǎ’s control of the Emperor as a hostage.
Unlike with the situation of Cáo Cāo building a state out of the ruins of Hàn, Sīmǎ Yì and his sons were carving out a new state within a still functional state like a parasite. Rather than building legitimacy through conquest, early Jìn built its legitimacy by destroying political rivals and undermining Wèi from within. Since Wèi, unlike Hàn, not yet really fallen yet, it was still had powerful loyalists that had to be carefully destroyed one by one. And so Sīmǎ Yì started by exterminating Cáo Shuǎng in the capital, but also carefully reassured the provinces to prevent wider open unrest, enough that he was able to surprise and disarm Wáng Líng before Líng was able to mobilize. But then Sīmǎ Shī killed Xiàhóu Xuán and deposed the Emperor Cáo Fāng, leading Guànqiū Jiǎn to rise up. Sīmǎ Shī was able to maintain the ambiguity enough to prevent Guànqiū Jiǎn from building up wider support, so that Jiǎn was defeated. Then as Sīmǎ Zhāo moved to purge the last few figures considered insufficiently loyal to the rising Sīmǎ clan, Zhūgě Dàn rose up, and after an arduous campaign Zhūgě Dàn too was destroyed.14 The only great loyalist left was the Emperor himself, and even when Gāoguì died for his state, his life was only able to buy his state three more years.
To Sīmǎ Zhāo’s credit, he was perhaps aware of the problems with how he and his clan were building legitimacy, as he emphasized the destruction of Zhūgě Dàn as a source of legitimacy in his bid to become Duke (never mind that Zhūgě Dàn’s rebellion had been triggered by him in the first place15). This was temporarily undone by the Regicide incident, but after the incident (and a few last political purges such as the execution of Jī Kāng16) the path to legitimacy was restored with the conquest of Shǔ-Hàn by Zhōng Huì and Dèng Ài. The document finally bestowing Sīmǎ Zhāo title as Duke of Jìn emphasized the achievements of the campaigns against Shǔ-Hàn and Wú and the suppression of Zhūgě Dàn, doing their best to try to list out the defeated and surrendered great officers to imitate the list of the warlords defeated by Cáo Cāo17 (and perhaps by extension the ancient documents of Qín and Hàn). Yet even then, in those final steps, despite claiming his legitimacy came from military conquest rather than political treachery, Sīmǎ Zhāo still had to keep the last puppet Emperor Cáo Huàn close at all times, and in the end even Dèng Ài and Zhōng Huì were purged.18
Against Generational Punishment
So far, I have avoided talking about the downfall of Western Jìn. Unlike fools like Lǐ Zhì and other such commentators who have, through the centuries, celebrated the fall of Wèi as righteous vengeance for Hàn, I do not think it fair to interpret the downfall of Western Jìn as some righteous vengeance or other such nonsense. What happened to Sīmǎ Zhōng, Chì, and Yè were tragedies which certainly do not “please the heart” on reading.
Okay, I suppose I do have to admit to, if not pleasure, a rather odd amusement, when I first learned of the story of the shaman who told Sīmǎ Chì that the downfall of Jìn was due to the redressing of the wrongs done to Cáo Shuǎng and Xiàhóu Xuán.19 In my defense, I don’t believe in the shaman’s claims, and I still greatly sympathize for Sīmǎ Chì’s sufferings anyways; it’s not like what happened to Shuǎng or Xuán was Sīmǎ Chì’s fault, no matter what generational punishment believers might say. My amusement comes from the evidence that even after Jìn’s legitimacy had been secured and the names of Cáo Shuǎng and Xiàhóu Xuán had been quite thoroughly dragged through the figurative mud for several decades, there were still some few out there who remembered Shuǎng and Xuán more generously.
That Jìn’s usurpation of Wèi was more vicious than Wèi's usurpation of Hàn was not due to some “coming around harder the second time” generational punishment of Cáo Cāo’s descendants, it was because Jìn’s legitimacy was built on political maneuvering rather than military conquest, which required more brutal actions. Cáo Cāo’s real power came from his army; the three Sīmǎ gained their power by holding the Emperor and therefore needed to maintain a much tighter leash on the Court. No matter what moralists like Lǐ Zhì may say, Gāoguì’s death was not because of, nor particularly deserved, by the identity of his great-grandfather.
Continuing from this, the downfall of Western Jìn was due to unsolved structural problems within the Empire, not some generational punishment for the wrongs done to Cáo Shuǎng, Xiàhóu Xuán, and others. And similarly what happened to Sīmǎ Zhōng, Chì, and Yè was not caused by nor deserved due to who their grandfathers and great-grandfathers and great-great-grandfathers were.
And for completeness, the downfall of Hàn was not generational punishment for the sins of Liú Bāng. Though Cáo Cāo did not go so far as to cross the line of deposing or regicide, he was still oppressive to Liú Xiè, and aside perhaps from those unknown contributors to the Sānguózhì Pínghuà’s reincarnation story, I suspect that very few moralists would say that Liú Xiè’s treatment was justified by what Liú Bāng did, even if Liú Xiè really were Liú Bāng reborn and Cáo Cāo really were Hán Xìn reborn.
Conclusion
Why write one when I can just quote the conclusion of Zhào Yì’s essay?
However [Cáo] Cāo raised troops after Hàn’s reign had been cut off, labored and campaigned, extending Hàn’s reign by over twenty years, and afterward replaced it. The Sīmǎ clan, when the Wèi House had not yet declined, took advantage of an opportunity to usurp authority, deposing one Emperor, regiciding one Emperor and seizing their throne; comparing them to [Cáo] Cāo, their achievements and crimes cannot be spoken of on the same day!20
Okay, I know Wèi isn’t a popular topic and I promise no more Wèi for a while. For real this time.
贄眉批: 比操前事又加利矣,快心,快心。
From The Untouchables (1987).
See Hàn shū 34 for the three together, or see Shǐ jì 90, 91, and 92.
Jìn shū 105: 大丈夫行事當礌礌落落,如日月皎然,終不能如曹孟德、司馬仲達父子,欺他孤兒寡婦,狐媚以取天下也。
“The Wèi and Jìn successions were not the same” 趙翼《魏晉禪代不同 》:曹之代漢,司馬氏之代魏,其跡雖同,而勢力尚有不同者。曹操自克袁尚後,即居於鄴,天子所都之許昌,僅留長史國淵、王必等,先後掌丞相府事。其時獻帝已三、四十歲,非如沖主之可無顧慮也,然一切用人行政、興師討伐,皆自鄴出令,莫敢有異志。 司馬氏輔魏,則身常在相府,與魏帝共在洛陽。無論懿專政未久,即師、昭兄弟,大權已在手,且齊王芳、高貴鄉公髦、常道鄉公奐皆幼年繼位,似可不必戒心。然師討毌邱儉,留昭鎮洛陽,及病篤,昭始赴軍。師既卒,魏帝命昭統兵鎮許昌,昭仍率兵歸洛,不敢遠在許下也。諸葛誕兵起,昭欲遣將則恐其不可信,而親行又恐都下有變,遂奉皇太后及高貴鄉公同往督軍。是可見其一日不敢離城社也。嘗推其故。操當漢室大壞之後,起義兵,誅暴亂,漢之臣如袁紹、呂布、劉表、陶謙等,能與操為敵者,多手自削平,或死或誅。其在朝者,不過如楊彪、孔融等數文臣,亦廢且殺。其餘列侯將帥,皆操所擢用。雖前有董承、王子服、吳子蘭、種輯、吳碩,後有韋晃、耿紀、金禕,欲匡漢害操,而皆無兵權,動輒撲滅。故安坐鄴城,而朝政悉自己出。司馬氏則當文帝、明帝國勢方隆之日,猝遇幼主嗣位,得竊威權。其時中外臣工,尚皆魏帝所用之人。內有張緝、蘇鑠、樂敦、劉賢等,伺隙相圖;外有王陵、毌邱儉、諸葛誕等,相繼起兵,聲討司馬氏。惟恃挾天子以肆其奸,一離京輦,則禍不可測。故父子三人執國柄,終不敢出國門一步。亦時勢使然也。
SJ 4: 周君、王赧卒,周民遂東亡。秦取九鼎寶器,而遷西周公於憚狐。後七歲,秦莊襄王滅東周。東西周皆入于秦,周既不祀。
SJ 6: 王曰:「去『泰』,著『皇』,采上古『帝』位號,號曰『皇帝』。他如議。」
SJ 8: 大王起微細,誅暴逆,平定四海,有功者輒裂地而封為王侯。大王不尊號,皆疑不信。臣等以死守之。
SJ 6: 寡人以眇眇之身,興兵誅暴亂,賴宗廟之靈,六王咸伏其辜,天下大定。今名號不更,無以稱成功,傳後世。其議帝號。
For example, in Shìshuō Xīnyǔ 10.18: 小庾在荊州,公朝大會,問諸僚佐曰:「我欲為漢高、魏武何如?」一坐莫答,長史江虨曰:「願明公為桓、文之事,不願作漢高、魏武也。」
SGZ 1. Translation stolen from The Annals of Wèi.
SGZ 9: 臣昔從遼東還,先帝詔陛下、秦王及臣升御床,把臣臂,深以後事為念。
See SGZ 28 for Wáng Líng, Guànqiū Jiǎn, and Zhūgě Dàn.
See SGZ 28 and its annotations. At one point, Zhōng Huì explicitly warned Sīmǎ Zhāo that his orders to Zhūgě Dàn would cause Dàn to rebel, but Sīmǎ Zhāo refused to cancel the orders. Reportedly Jiǎ Chōng had also advised Sīmǎ Zhāo that it would be better to force Zhūgě Dàn to rebel earlier rather than later.
For Jī Kāng see attachments to Wáng Càn in SGZ 21, and JS 49.
See JS 2 for the document. I will not attempt a translation at this time.
It is perhaps very telling that Chén Shòu decided to classify Dèng Ài and Zhōng Huì together with Wáng Líng, Guànqiū Jiǎn, and Zhūgě Dàn in SGZ 28.
《異苑》曰:晉宣帝誅王陵后寢疾,日見陵逼,帝呼曰:「彥云彥云,陵之字也。緩我。」身上便有打處。賈逵亦為祟,少日遂薨。初,陵既被執,過賈逵廟,呼曰:「賈梁道,王陵魏之忠臣,惟爾有神知之。」故逵助焉。及永嘉之亂,有覡見帝,涕泗云:「家國傾覆,是曹爽、夏侯玄訴怨得伸故也。」爽以勢族致誅,玄從時望被戮。
《魏晉禪代不同 》:然操起兵於漢祚垂絕之後,力征經營,延漢祚者二十餘年,然後代之。司馬氏當魏室未衰,乘機竊權,廢一帝、弒一帝而奪其位,比之于操,其功罪不可同日語矣!