The reign of Wèi Emperor Wén, Cáo Pī, usually gets maligned in popular portrayal.1 In some respects, this is to be expected given how short it was compared to the three decade career of his father or even the thirteen year reign of his son, not to mention his failure to achieve either a negotiated settlement with Wú, plus his failure to make lasting gains in his military campaigns against Wú after those negotiations failed. Yet, while the criticisms of his failures are certainly valid, it can be important to remember that things as complicated as an Emperor’s reign, even one as short as six to seven years, probably should not be considered so easily reducible to a simple binary “good/bad” label. Despite his failures, Cáo Pī did manage a few small but notable successes, and it is worth keeping those successes in mind along with the records of his failures.
The Western Campaigns
The historiography records that Liáng province was “settled” after the campaigns of Xiàhóu Yuān in the mid 210s, and though Xiàhóu Yuān certainly did accomplish great achievements in crushing the strongest local leaders, particularly his destruction of the rebel state of Sòng Jiān,2 probably there was still a measure of instability, for the historiography continues to record a few disturbances in the west,3 and there is also no record of an attempt by the Hàn dynasty to reassert authority over the Western Regions beyond Liáng province.
Shortly after succeeding his father in early 220, Cáo Pī delegated the task of exerting greater authority of the west to his closely trusted cousin Cáo Zhēn, where Cáo Zhēn participated in the suppression of the rebellion of Zhāng Jìn that year.4 By the autumn of 221, Cáo Zhēn and the other officers of the west scored another major victory against a group of Hú chieftains, so that the historiography records that the lands west of the Hé (Yellow River) were all pacified.5 Following these efforts, in early 222, Wèi formally reasserted its claim to authority over the west with the appointment of a Wǔjì Colonel to govern the Western Regions,6 the furthest west the empire had reached since the Liáng province rebellion in 184 had cut off access some 40 years ago.
Centralization in the East
In mapping Cáo Cāo’s rise, one possible way of organizing a periodization is to count one phase as his initial rise in Yǎn province and expansion into Yù province (about 193 - 196), a second phase as his expansion into the eastern province of Xú (197 - 200), and a third phase of conquering the northern provinces of Jì, Qīng, Bìng, and Yōu, all formerly held by the Yuán clan (200 - 207).
The second phase, the conquest of the east, was largely capped off by the destruction of Lǚ Bù in the early months of 199, as Lǚ Bù had probably been the greatest power in the region and had also sought to claim title as Governor over Xú province. However, Lǚ Bù’s control over the east had been incomplete, such that smaller local leaders were able to maintain a measure of autonomy, and even after Lǚ Bù’s downfall, these smaller leaders were able to maintain autonomy after shifting their allegiances from Lǚ Bù to Cáo Cāo.7
For the most part, Cáo Cāo was probably content with the situation, as delegating the affairs of the east to these autonomous locals freed himself to personally focus on the more pressing issue of Yuán Shào to the north, and during Cáo Cāo’s northern campaigns, the autonomous powers did provide indirect aid by harassing the Yuán clan’s eastern flank in Qīng province while Cáo Cāo and Yuán Shào faced off directly in the central plains in Yǎn province.8 Yet there is perhaps evidence that the situation could also occasionally cause headaches.
Late in 199 and into early 200, before Yuán Shào’s attack was fully launched, Cáo Cāo had sent his officer Liú Bèi east to prevent Yuán Shù from leading his forces north to join Yuán Shào. After Yuán Shù turned back and died, Liú Bèi then took advantage to kill the local Inspector of Xú province installed by Cáo Cāo and claim control over the province. Many of the local leaders quickly accepted this change and shifted their allegiance to Liú Bèi. Cáo Cāo was quick to react and very soon defeated Liú Bèi in a lightning campaign, whereupon most of the local leaders switched back to Cáo Cāo.9 The relative ease by which these leaders had apparently shifted their allegiances from Lǚ Bù to Cáo Cāo to Liú Bèi back to Cáo Cāo may be evidence that the autonomy of the locals was such that the east might be captured relatively easily but a bit harder to hold.
Further evidence for the more autonomous nature of eastern powers may be found in the case of Chāng Xì (also known by the name Chāng Bà), one of the local leaders based on the coast. After Liú Bèi’s defeat in 200, he surrendered back to Cáo Cāo, only to rebel again, surrender again, and rebel again, until at last Cáo Cāo’s officer Yú Jīn executed him after defeating and capturing him around 206.10
From then on, there are not too many accounts of troubles in the east until Cáo Cāo’s death in 220, where we are told that upon hearing news of his passing, the Qīng province troops almost mutinied until placated by licenses to plunder.11
There is evidence that Cáo Pī sought to exert more direct control over the eastern parts of the empire after succeeding his father. He appointed his closely trusted officer Cáo Xiū to serve as overall commander over the military affairs of Qīng and Xú provinces, and then, during one of his tours of the east, Cáo Pī then took advantage to summon Zāng Bà, probably the most powerful of the semi-autonomous eastern leaders, to an audience, and had Zāng Bà’s military authority removed.12
In that respects, Cáo Pī’s eastern campaigns against Wú, though they failed to conquer Wú itself, probably still saw some successes in the sense that they allowed him to exert more direct authority over the eastern parts of his empire at the expense of the local authorities such as Zāng Bà. There are even a few more recent historians who have speculated that perhaps this could have been a secret objective of the eastern campaigns.13 After all, Cáo Pī probably would not have really expected Wú to be easily conquered after his own father had failed to accomplish it in three campaigns, and would therefore have other, more limited goals in mind while planning his own campaigns. Of course, that is only speculation, but the idea is a reminder that campaigns can have multiple objective and achieve some smaller goals even if they fail to achieve the largest goals.
Retaking the South
In some respects, Cáo Cāo had died at a rather unfortunate time. Only the year before his death, he had suffered a series of setbacks from Liú Bèi’s conquest of Hànzhōng, including Liú Fēng and Mèng Dá extending this to the eastern Shàngyōng part of Hànzhōng, to Guān Yǔ’s major offensive in the Xiàngyáng-Fánchéng region. Though Guān Yǔ was ultimately defeated and destroyed, the southern garrisons under Cáo Rén had been exhausted by their hard-fought defense, and soon after Cáo Cāo’s death and Cáo Pī’s succession, Cáo Rén requested to destroy and abandon Xiàngyáng and Fánchéng and pull the line of control further back to Wǎnchéng, a proposal that Cáo Pī approved.14
During the period before his succession and his claim to Imperial title, Cáo Pī did score a notable victory in the form of the defection of Mèng Dá. Liú Fēng and Mèng Dá had fought over authority, and both had also lost standing over their inability to rescue Guān Yǔ, and so Mèng Dá led his sizable following north to surrender.15
After claiming Imperial title, Cáo Pī moved quickly and decisively to rebuild Wèi’s southern positions. Mèng Dá was sent back south to Shàngyōng, with further military support by Xiàhóu Shàng and Xǔ Huǎng, where they greatly defeated Liú Fēng, forcing him to retreat to Chéngdū in disgrace. The eastern parts of Hànzhōng were captured and carved out to establish a separate Shàngyōng prefecture headed by Mèng Dá. Similarly, Cáo Rén and Xǔ Huǎng were also sent back south to retake Xiāngyáng, driving out Sūn Quán’s officer Chén Shào, who had briefly occupied the area in their absence.16 In that regard, Cáo Pī had been able to oversee a partial reversal of the most serious southern setbacks, and the records tell us that Xiàhóu Shàng, who Cáo Pī appointed to serve as an overall commander over the southern front, oversaw something of a revitalization of the region to strengthen Wèi’s southern defenses.17
Keeping the Pressure On
So despite his ultimate failures to conquer Wú, it could be argued that Cáo Pī still managed to build upon the achievements of his father. In the west he was able to build upon the foundations laid by Cáo Cāo and Xiàhóu Yuān and others in the Guānzhōng region and beyond to restore connection to the Western Regions, recalling the past glories of Hàn’s empire in the west. Meanwhile in the east he expanded on his father’s previous conquests to exert a stronger grip over the local officers, and to the south he was able to stop and then revert the more serious setbacks that had occurred in his father’s last year, recovering and stabilizing the front at Shàngyōng and Xiāngyáng.
Even his own last year, Cáo Pī was still pursuing his own vision for how Wú should be subdued. His third and last campaign against Wú occurred during this year, and it was also during this year that he continued to order and oversee construction and expansion of fortified positions, towers, and canals in the region.18 Cáo Pī’s failures were certainly not from a lack of trying, and the popular myth that he was an incompetent successor who ruined the legacy of his father is at best a gross oversimplification.
For example, the 2010 television drama Sān Guó calls him an Emperor without achievements when covering his reign and death.
《三國志·魏書一·武帝紀》初,隴西宋建自稱河首平漢王,聚衆枹罕,改元,置百官,三十餘年。遣夏侯淵自興國討之。冬十月,屠枹罕,斬建,涼州平。
《三國志·魏書九·夏侯淵傳》初,枹罕宋建因涼州亂,自號河首平漢王。太祖使淵帥諸將討建。淵至,圍枹罕,月餘拔之,斬建及所置丞相已下。淵別遣張郃等平河關,渡河入小湟中,河西諸羌盡降,隴右平。太祖下令曰:「宋建造為亂逆三十餘年,淵一舉滅之,虎步關右,所向無前。仲尼有言:『吾與爾不如也。』」
《三國志注·魏書二·文帝紀》酒泉黃華、張掖張進等各執太守以叛。金城太守蘇則討進,斬之。華降。
《三國志·魏書九·曹真傳》文帝即王位,以真為鎮西將軍,假節都督雍、涼州諸軍事。錄前後功,進封東鄉侯。張進等反於酒泉,真遣費耀討破之,斬進等。
《三國志注·魏書二·文帝紀》魏書曰:十一月辛未,鎮西將軍曹真命衆將及州郡兵討破叛胡治元多、蘆水、封賞等,斬首五萬餘級,獲生口十萬,羊一百一十一萬口,牛八萬,河西遂平。帝初聞胡決水灌顯美,謂左右諸將曰:「昔隗嚻灌略陽,而光武因其疲弊,進兵滅之。今胡決水灌顯美,其事正相似,破胡事今至不久。」旬日,破胡告檄到,上大笑曰:「吾策之於帷幕之內,諸將奮擊於萬里之外,其相應若合符契。前後戰克獲虜,未有如此也。」
《三國志·魏書二·文帝紀》二月,鄯善、龜茲、于闐王各遣使奉獻,詔曰:「西戎即叙,氐、羌來王,詩、書美之。頃者西域外夷並款塞內附,其遣使者撫勞之。」是後西域遂通,置戊己校尉。
《三國志·魏書一·武帝紀》太山臧霸、孫觀、吳敦、尹禮、昌狶各聚衆。布之破劉備也,霸等悉從布。布敗,獲霸等,公厚納待,遂割青、徐二州附于海以委焉,分琅邪、東海、北海為城陽、利城、昌慮郡。
《三國志·魏書一·武帝紀》秋八月,公進軍黎陽,使臧霸等入青州破齊、北海、東安,留于禁屯河上。
《三國志·魏書一·武帝紀》袁術自敗於陳,稍困,袁譚自青州遣迎之。術欲從下邳北過,公遣劉備、朱靈要之。會術病死。程昱、郭嘉聞公遣備,言於公曰:「劉備不可縱。」公悔,追之不及。備之未東也,陰與董承等謀反,至下邳,遂殺徐州刺史車冑,舉兵屯沛。遣劉岱、王忠擊之,不克。
《三國志·蜀書二·先主傳》先主乃殺徐州刺史車冑,留關羽守下邳,而身還小沛。東海昌霸反,郡縣多叛曹公為先主,衆數萬人,遣孫乾與袁紹連和,曹公遣劉岱、王忠擊之,不克。五年,曹公東征先主,先主敗績。曹公盡收其衆,虜先主妻子,并禽關羽以歸。
《三國志·魏書一·武帝紀》遂東擊備,破之,生禽其將夏侯博。備走奔紹,獲其妻子。備將關羽屯下邳,復進攻之,羽降。昌狶叛為備,又攻破之。
《三國志·魏書九·夏侯淵傳》昌狶反,遣于禁擊之,未拔,復遣淵與禁并力,遂擊狶,降其十餘屯,狶詣禁降。
《三國志·魏書十七·于禁傳》昌豨復叛,遣禁征之。禁急進攻豨;豨與禁有舊,詣禁降。諸將皆以為豨已降,當送詣太祖,禁曰:「諸君不知公常令乎!圍而後降者不赦。夫奉法行令,事上之節也。豨雖舊友,禁可失節乎!」自臨與豨決,隕涕而斬之。是時太祖軍淳于,聞而歎曰:「豨降不詣吾而歸禁,豈非命耶!」益重禁。
《三國志注·魏書十五·賈逵傳》魏略曰:時太子在鄴,鄢陵侯未到,士民頗苦勞役,又有疾癘,於是軍中搔動。羣寮恐天下有變,欲不發喪。逵建議為不可祕,乃發哀,令內外皆入臨,臨訖,各安叙不得動。而青州軍擅擊鼓相引去。衆人以為宜禁止之,不從者討之。逵以為「方大喪在殯,嗣王未立,宜因而撫之」。乃為作長檄,告所在給其廩食。
《三國志注·魏書十八·臧霸傳》魏略曰:霸一名奴寇。孫觀名嬰子。吳敦名黯奴。尹禮名盧兒。建安二十四年,霸遣別軍在洛。會太祖崩,霸所部及青州兵,以為天下將亂,皆鳴鼓擅去。文帝即位,以曹休都督青、徐,霸謂休曰:「國家未肯聽霸耳!若假霸步騎萬人,必能橫行江表。」休言之於帝,帝疑霸軍前擅去,今意壯乃爾!遂東巡,因霸來朝而奪其兵
田余庆.《秦汉魏晋史探微》.北京:中华书局,2011年:第98—128页
曹丕在广陵之役中最终解决了青徐豪霸割据一方的问题,增进了魏国的稳定,巩固了北方的统一,可以说是他在位七年中的一件可以称说而又被人们忽略了的政治大事……广陵之役解决了青徐问题,使东方归于一统,魏国国势更加强大起来。
《晉書·卷一·宣帝紀》魏文帝即位,封河津亭侯,轉丞相長史。會孫權帥兵西過,朝議以樊、襄陽無穀,不可以禦寇。時曹仁鎮襄陽,請召仁還宛。帝曰:「孫權新破關羽,此其欲自結之時也,必不敢為患。襄陽水陸之衝,禦寇要害,不可棄也。」言竟不從。仁遂焚棄二城,權果不為寇,魏文悔之。
《三國志·蜀書十·劉封傳》自關羽圍樊城、襄陽,連呼封、達,令發兵自助。封、達辭以山郡初附,未可動搖,不承羽命。會羽覆敗,先主恨之。又封與達忿爭不和,封尋奪達鼔吹。達旣懼罪,又忿恚封,遂表辭先主,率所領降魏。
《三國志·魏書九·曹仁傳》後召還屯宛。孫權遣將陳邵據襄陽,詔仁討之。仁與徐晃攻破邵,遂入襄陽,使將軍高遷等徙漢南附化民於漢北,文帝遣使即拜仁大將軍。
《三國志·魏書九·夏侯尚傳》荊州殘荒,外接蠻夷,而與吳阻漢水為境,舊民多居江南。尚自上庸通道,西行七百餘里,山民蠻夷多服從者,五六年間,降附數千家。
《三國志·魏書二·文帝紀》六年春二月,遣使者循行許昌以東盡沛郡,問民所疾苦,貧者振貸之。
《三國志·魏書二·文帝紀》三月,行幸召陵,通討虜渠。乙巳,還許昌宮。并州刺史梁習討鮮卑軻比能,大破之。辛未,帝為舟師東征。五月戊申,幸譙。壬戌,熒惑入太微。
《三國志·魏書二·文帝紀》八月,帝遂以舟師自譙循渦入淮,從陸道幸徐。九月,築東巡臺。冬十月,行幸廣陵故城,臨江觀兵,戎卒十餘萬,旌旗數百里。是歲大寒,水道冰,舟不得入江,乃引還。
《三國志注·魏書二·文帝紀》魏略載詔曰:「昔軒轅建四面之號,周武稱『予有亂臣十人』,斯蓋先聖所以體國君民,亮成天工,多賢為貴也。今內有公卿以鎮京師,外設牧伯以監四方,至於元戎出征,則軍中宜有柱石之賢帥,輜重所在,又宜有鎮守之重臣,然後車駕可以周行天下,無內外之慮。吾今當征賊,欲守之積年。其以尚書令潁鄉侯陳羣為鎮軍大將軍,尚書僕射西鄉侯司馬懿為撫軍大將軍。若吾臨江授諸將方略,則撫軍當留許昌,督後諸軍,錄後臺文書事;鎮軍隨車駕,當董督衆軍,錄行尚書事;皆假節鼓吹,給中軍兵騎六百人。吾欲去江數里,築宮室,往來其中,見賊可擊之形,便出奇兵擊之;若或未可,則當舒六軍以遊獵,饗賜軍士。」
I've certainly never considered Cao Pi incompetent, but whether it's fair or not, the first thing that comes to mind when I think of him is his failure to take advantage of the fighting between Liu Bei and Sun Quan. Perhaps I'd remember him differently if he'd ruled for a few decades instead of a mere six years.