Unqualified Appraisal 2: Zhūgě Kè, Part II
He knew how to win, but not how to lose
Continuing off from last time:
The extant historiography records the events leading up to the assassination and its aftermath in far more detail than most other accounts of the deaths of great figures of the time period. This in itself is informative on just how much of a legend Zhūgě Kè was in his own time and became in the centuries immediately after his death.
Previously, when Zhūgě Kè was about to lead his northern campaign, a man in mourning dress entered Kè’s office building. When interrogated as to why he was trespassing, the man replied that he had stumbled in unaware. Despite the office being heavily guarded, none of the security guards reported seeing him go in. Later, after Zhūgě Kè had set out, the wooden pillars in the rooms where Zhūgě Kè held his meetings fractured. During Zhūgě Kè’s return journey, a white rainbow was once seeing surrounding his boat, and at a later time another white rainbow was seen surrounding his carriage.1
The night before the scheduled meeting at the Palace, Zhūgě Kè felt agitated and could not sleep. The next morning, when brought water to rinse and wash himself, he smelled a foul odor in it, and when brought his clothes, he smelled a foul odor on it as well. He had the water and clothes changed, but when the new water and clothes were brought, the odor persisted. When he was about to leave, his dog bit his robe. Kè said: “The dog does not wish me to go?” He returned and sat inside, but when he got up to leave again, the dog again bit his robe. Kè had his attendants go walk the dog, and then ascended his carriage.2
When he arrived outside the Palace and left his carriage, he was greeted by Sūn Jùn. As Zhūgě Kè had arrived late, Sūn Jùn was afraid his plan had leaked, and so went personally to observe Zhūgě Kè. To test him, Sūn Jùn said: “If you do not feel well, you can remain behind, and I will go report it to his majesty.” Kè replied: “I can enter by my own strength,” and entered the Palace complex. Several attendants to the Emperor, Zhāng Yuē and Zhū Ēn and others, were suspicious and secretly sent a written message to Zhūgě Kè, saying: “The gathering today is out of the ordinary, there might be an ulterior motive.” Zhūgě Kè read the secret letter and prepared to leave. However, as he reached the outer gates of the complex, he happened to meet Téng Yìn.3
There are two accounts as to what happened next. By one account, Kè made excuses to Téng Yìn: “I suddenly have stomach pains, and cannot go.” Unaware of Sūn Jùn’s plot, Téng Yìn said: “You have already arrived and not yet met his majesty, now his majesty has set up wine to invite you, and you are already at the gates, you should make the effort to go.”4 By the other account, as Zhūgě Kè and Téng Yìn were close political allies and relatives by marriage (Kè's son was married to Yìn's daughter), Zhūgě Kè showed the secret letter he had received. Téng Yìn advised Zhūgě Kè to leave, but Kè said: “What ability does that little man Jùn have to do evil? I am only afraid he will take advantage of intoxication,” and therefore he brought his own medicinal liquor, to avoid having to drink the provided alcohol at the meeting. The historian Sūn Shèng comments that the latter anecdote seems more plausible due to Kè’s closer relationship with Téng Yìn than with Zhāng Yuē and the rest, and also argues that the account is also more in keeping with Zhūgě Kè’s reputation for overconfidence.5
Zhūgě Kè entered the palace hall wearing his sword and shoes, a rare and special honor reserved for exceptional ministers.6 After paying his respects to the Emperor Sūn Liàng, Zhūgě Kè took his seat at the meeting, and the alcohol was passed around. Zhūgě Kè did not drink, and seeing this, Sūn Jùn said: “As your illness has not yet recovered, and you always take a medicinal liquor, you can drink that instead.” Zhūgě Kè was calmed and drank his own medicinal liquor. After several rounds, the child Emperor Sūn Liàng withdrew back inside to the inner apartments,7 while Sūn Jùn acted as if he were going to the lavatory.
While away, Sūn Jùn changed out of his long robes and put on short clothes. He returned wielding saber and declared: “There is Imperial Order to arrest Zhūgě Kè!”8 Zhūgě Kè immediately moved to rise and draw his sword, but before he could, Sūn Jùn cut him down. The attendant Zhāng Yuē was nearby and struck at Sūn Jùn, wounding Jùn’s left hand, but Sūn Jùn turned and struck back, cutting off Yuē’s right arm. The guards rushed up into the palace hall, but Sūn Jùn ordered them to stand down: “The one to arrest was Kè, and now he is already dead.” All were ordered to sheathe their weapons, the ground was cleaned, and the drinking resumed.9
Zhūgě Kè was about fifty at the time of his assassination.10
By one account in a compilation of supernatural stories, during the assassination, Zhūgě Kè’s wife was at home, and said to a maidservant: “Why do you smell like blood?” The maidservant said: “I don’t.” Later, the wife again asked the maidservant: “Why is your gaze out of the ordinary?” The maidservant suddenly jumped and rammed her head against a pillar, waving her arms and gnashing her teeth and shouting: “Lord Zhūgě has been killed by Sūn Jùn!” Therefore everyone in the household knew that Zhūgě Kè was dead, and very soon after the soldiers arrived.11
Zhūgě Kè’s two sons Sǒng and Jiàn attempted to flee with their mother. Sūn Jùn sent troops in pursuit, killing Sǒng. Jiàn managed to cross the Yángzǐ river, attempting to flee north to Wèi, but he also was chased down and captured. Zhūgě Kè’s sisters’ sons Zhāng Zhèn and Zhū Ēn and the rest were also killed. All their clans were exterminated to the third degree.12 At the time of the assassination, Zhūgě Kè's younger brother Róng was still a military commander posted in Wú’s western positions. Orders were sent to the other regional officers to attack him. As the troops surrounded his garrison, Zhūgě Róng took poison and died, and his three sons were all executed.13 Zhūgě Kè’s close friend Niè Yǒu was not charged with any crimes, but Sūn Jùn feared him, and had him reassigned to a less important position, and soon after Niè Yǒu died under suspicious circumstances.14
Aftermath
After killing Zhūgě Kè, Sūn Jùn took over control of the government. Téng Yìn was an old ally of Zhūgě Kè and his daughter was married to Zhūgě Kè’s son Sǒng, but Sūn Jùn made a show of declaring that Zhūgě Kè’s punishment would not extend to Téng Yìn, and though Jùn and Yìn remained suspicious of each other in private, both maintained appearances of cooperation for the sake of restoring stability to the Wú empire.15 However, as various ministers proposed that Téng Yìn should be promoted to high office, second in rank after Sūn Jùn, in order to support the new administration, Sūn Jùn angrily rejected these proposals and concentrated power on himself, to the disappointment of all the officials.16
Stability did not return after the assassination of Zhūgě Kè. As Sūn Jùn was without fame and achievement, he instead enforced his power through oppression and was arrogant and cruel, many were punished and killed, and very soon there were more assassination plots directed against Sūn Jùn himself. These were discovered and those connected to the various plots were brutally exterminated, including Sūn Quán's daughter Lǔyù.17 The instability of Wú meant that it was unable to take advantage of instability in Wèi, and Sūn Jùn’s efforts to intervene in the 255 uprising of Guànqiū Jiǎn were defeated.18 In 256, while planning another northern campaign against Wèi, Sūn Jùn visited the camp of General Lǚ Jù and observed that Jù’s forces were neat and orderly, and hated this. Claiming heart pains, Sūn Jùn left, but then had a nightmare of being attacked by Zhūgě Kè. He fell ill, and after hastily entrusting his power to his younger cousin Sūn Chēn, Sūn Jùn died at thirty-eight.19
The political instability continued. Lǚ Jù and later Téng Yìn were purged and killed by Sūn Chēn’s regime. The young Emperor Sūn Liàng, now in his teens, himself plotted to retake power, but Sūn Chēn struck first and deposed Liàng in 258, replacing him with Sūn Quán’s son sixth son Sūn Xiū, only for Sūn Xiū to lead a successful plot to kill Sūn Chēn a few months later. When Sūn Xiū died in 264 with his sons still young, the great ministers Púyáng Xīng and Zhāng Bù took it upon themselves to disinherit Xiū’s sons and install Sūn Quán’s adult grandson Sūn Hào, but fearing inability to control Hào they again plotted to remove him. Sūn Hào struck first and executed them. Throughout this period, Wú continued to suffer internal plots and rebellions and general inability to respond to opportunities or crises in Wèi and Shǔ-Hàn. In 280, as Zhūgě Kè had predicted and warned, Wú was conquered by a northern state with a much larger army and much greater resources.20
Historical Appraisals
In his own time, Zhūgě Kè was heavily praised by those who knew him for his genius. He was a personal friend of Sūn Quán's eldest son and first Heir-Apparent Sūn Dēng, and Sūn Dēng once had Hú Zōng write a catalogue of appraisals of his friends; the entry on Zhūgě Kè described him thus:
Illustrious talent outstanding, surpassing ordinary sorts, that is Zhūgě Kè.
However, Yáng Chén privately wrote a counter-catalogue that rebutted Hú Zōng’s point by point, the corresponding entry for Zhūgě Kè reading:
Yuánxùn is talented but negligent.21
As Sūn Dēng lay dying of illness in 241, he sent a final letter to his father, in which he made special mention of his friend:
Zhūgě Kè’s talent and sagacity is extensive and far-reaching, he is a vessel to be appointed to assist the times.22
Distant Observers
Zhūgě Kè’s fame naturally spread beyond Wú. By one account, after Sīmǎ Shī’s humiliating defeat by Zhūgě Kè, Wèi official Zhāng Qī reassured Sīmǎ Shī that Zhūgě Kè would die very soon after. Sīmǎ Shī asked the reason, and Zhāng Qī explained:
His power disturbs his master, his achievements engulfs his entire state, though he wish not to die can be obtain it?23
That is, with his such power and prestige in Wú, outshining all others, including the Emperor himself, the Wú Court would not be able to tolerate Zhūgě Kè for too long.
After Zhūgě Kè's defeat at Héféi Xīnchéng, Wèi officer Dèng Ài also made remark on Zhūgě Kè in the context of wider problems within Wú.
Sūn Quán is already dead, their great ministers are not yet attached, Wú's powerful clans all have their own retainer forces, with military power sufficient to establish their own orders. Kè newly maintains the state’s government, but inside there is no master, he does not attend to comforting and relieving the high and low to establish foundations, but fights in external affairs, oppressively employing their people and all their state’s forces. He was stopped by a strong city, the dead in the tens of thousands. To carry this disaster and return, this is the day of Kè receiving punishment. In the past Zǐ Xū, Wú Qǐ, Shāng Yāng, Yuè Yì all met with appointment by their time’s ruler; when their master died, they were destroyed. All the more for Kè; his ability is not of those four worthies, but he does not think of the great misfortunes; his destruction can be waited for.24
That is, after Sūn Quán’s death, the Wú central government was having increasing difficulty maintaining centralized control over the upper class great clans. Kè had failed to restore sufficient cohesion to Wú and, with his recent defeat, would now be destroyed by it.
Interestingly, both Zhāng Qī and Dèng Ài came to bad ends themselves, but those are other stories to be discussed later.
Posthumous Discussions
When the Emperor Sūn Xiū took back power and purged Sūn Chēn, he ordered that both Sūn Jùn and Sūn Chēn be posthumously expelled from the Sūn clan and stripped of their offices and honors. Zhūgě Kè, Téng Yìn, and Lǚ Jù were all posthumously rehabilitated, and those who had been exiled in connection to them were recalled back.25 Zhūgě Kè's younger brother Qiáo had previously been sent to Shǔ to be adopted over as heir to his uncle Zhūgě Liàng, but Liàng later had sons of his own while Zhūgě Jǐn’s branch of the family had been wiped out with Zhūgě Kè, so Qiáo’s son Pān returned to Wú to restore Jǐn’s succession line.26
However, as the ministers of Wú proposed erecting a stone monument with an engraved account of Zhūgě Kè’s great achievements, the scholar Shèng Chōng argued that it was inappropriate, and the Emperor Sūn Xiū agreed, stating:
In the height of summer he sent out the army, the soldiers suffered, without a measure of achievement. He cannot be called able. He was appointed with being entrusted with the orphan, but died at the hands of a petty fellow. He cannot be called wise.27
Strictly speaking, Zhūgě Kè did not deploy the army during the summer. He set out in spring, and the campaign continued into the summer due to following the mistaken advice to besiege Héféi Xīnchéng instead of following his original plan for a lightning campaign across the Huáinán region focusing on capturing and depriving Wèi of its human resources, but the more general meaning of the appraisal does have merit.
The canonical appraisal given by Chén Shòu at the end of Zhūgě Kè’s biography states:
Zhūgě Kè had talent and spirit, competence and strategy, was praised by his country men, however he was arrogant and stingy. Zhōu-gōng avoided adulation, all the more should have Kè! He boasted of himself and denigrated others; could he have been without defeat? If his personal conduct had been like in his letters to Lù Xùn and his younger brother [Zhūgě] Róng, then regret and disgrace would not have arrived, and what disaster would there have been?28
My Appraisal
He knew how to win, but not how to lose.
In other words, yeah, I pretty much agree with the usual consensus: Zhūgě Kè was brilliant, a talent and genius that few could match, but personal failings such as arrogance and over-confidence led to his downfall. But I will explain a bit more about what exactly that all meant in practice, first by talking a bit about just how much winning Kè did before his downfall, which I feel most commentators of the past have not fully appreciated.
Comparing Kè and Liàng
There has been a natural tendency to compare the uncle and nephew: both Zhūgě Kè and Zhūgě Liàng were regents for their respective states, entrusted with the next orphaned ruler by their dying masters, and both pursued ambitious northern campaigns against Wèi. The general consensus of the past eighteen centuries has probably been that Liàng was better by far.
I’m sure at least some of you are here for controversial hot takes. Here’s one: Zhūgě Kè was better than his uncle Liàng.
Alright, before everybody goes completely insane in protest and anger and accuses me of denigrating Zhūgě Liàng, I’ll clarify:
This is not saying that Zhūgě Liàng was “bad.” Liàng was undoubtedly one of the greatest men of the era. All I’m saying is that Kè managed to be even better. A tiger can be larger than a lion without calling a lion small.
When I say “better,” I mean in the sense that I view Kè as having more raw talent than Liàng, and as rising to higher office than Liàng. However, talent and rank are not everything, which is why Liàng had a better end than Kè and probably why Liàng has tended to be appraised much more positively by later historians.
Wit
Zhūgě Liàng ended up becoming something of a legend in Shǔ, which should have encouraged preservation of any anecdotes of wit and genius in debate, so the lack of extant anecdotes for Zhūgě Liàng’s wit is striking when compared to the numerous stories of Zhūgě Kè’s wit. See Part I for just some of the extant anecdotes. There are still several more that I didn’t include.
Point: Kè.
Well, that’s the case in the historiography at least; I know there are many fictitious anecdotes for Zhūgě Liàng, like the story of Liàng beating the Wú ministers in debate during his embassy to Wú in 208.29 But even then, I honestly find the Kè anecdotes in the historiography far superior to the fictitious Liàng anecdotes. That isn’t a criticism of Liàng; it’s a criticism of the unknown authors of such anecdotes, most of whom were definitely not as smart as either Liàng or Kè. To steal a line from an anonymous commentator talking about something completely different, Zhūgě Liàng in most fiction “is a smart person written by a stupid person to whom smart people are indistinguishable from wizards.”30
Rank
Zhūgě Liàng reached the rank of Chancellor 丞相 (in charge of ‘assisting the Son of Heaven in governing all affairs’31), while Zhūgě Kè is primarily known for holding rank as Grand Tutor 太傅 (in charge of ‘teaching and guiding’ the Emperor32).
There is potentially some ambiguity as to which rank should be considered higher during the Three States period. During Later Hàn, Grand Tutor was considered the most honored office,33 while Chancellor was generally not used at all until Hàn’s final decades, where-in it gained certain connotations: in 189, Dǒng Zhuó had the office of Chancellor of State 相國 restored for himself, and in 208, Cáo Cāo had the office of Chancellor restored for himself. As a result, the Chancellor type offices seem to have gradually come to be treated as higher. At its foundation, Wèi did not use either a Chancellor or Grand Tutor position, but in 226, Wèi first appointed Zhōng Yáo34 as a Grand Tutor, and later Sīmǎ Yì was promoted to the position in 240. Following Sīmǎ Yì’s coup in 249, it was proposed that the Chancellor position be specially restored for him, implying that Chancellor was to be treated as a more honored rank.35 The ranking situation in Shǔ and Wú shows similar ambiguities: Xǔ Jìng was appointed Grand Tutor to Liú Bèi as King of Hànzhōng in 219 to 221, but when Liú Bèi claimed Imperial title in 221, Xǔ Jìng instead became Excellency over the Masses and was treated as ranking after Zhūgě Liàng as Chancellor.36
And here’s where I reveal where that above paragraph of wondering about the technicalities of relative rank actually was a sort of unnecessary digression, because there is evidence that Zhūgě Kè held both ranks. By one account, after his victorious first northern campaign, Kè was given additional office as Chancellor. Kè was also simultaneously appointed Governor of two provinces (Jīng and Yáng) at that time,37 which puts him above Liàng, who was Governor of one (Yì). Anyways, there really shouldn’t be much contention on this one: Kè surpassed Liàng in rank.
Point: Kè.
Pacification Campaigns
Zhūgě Liàng’s southern campaign in 225 successfully pacified the Nánzhōng region and gained natural and human resources for Zhūgě Liàng’s northern campaigns, but Liàng was not able to leave permanent garrisons,38 and there would continue to be smaller scale uprisings in the area.39 In pacifying the Shānyuè, a major internal problem for Wú for the past three decades, Zhūgě Kè succeeded in his stated goal of building an army of forty thousand within three years; the total figure of surrendered people likely approached a hundred thousand.40 Everyone else, including Kè’s own father, thought the achievement was impossible, but Kè proved them all wrong. Furthermore, while Liàng’s campaign was on Shǔ’s southern frontier, Kè led his pacification campaigns through Dānyáng, close to the northern front against Wèi.
Though the Nánzhōng campaign was a great achievement that secured natural and human resources and the rear for Liàng's northern campaigns, the project and its returns still seem to be of smaller scale than Kè’s pacification campaigns in Dānyáng.
Point: Kè.
Making the Case for Northern Campaigns
Both Liàng and Kè wrote famed public statements discussing their arguments in favor of northern campaigns against Wèi: Liàng’s Chū shī biǎo “Memorial on deploying forces,” and Kè’s Chū jūn lùn “Discussion on deploying armies.”41
Though Liàng’s biǎo is nominally about his planned northern campaign, the early sections digress to give the Emperor Liú Shàn some general advice on ruling and mention a few officials and officers that he should consult on affairs. Then, when mentioning the planned campaign, Liàng recounts his personal relationship with the former Emperor Liú Bèi as the foundation for his motivation. Perhaps this is to be expected though. As the text is a biǎo, the intended audience is probably mostly the Emperor Liú Shàn alone. As the campaign was probably already decided at that point, Liàng is free to take the northern campaign as a given, simply the next logical step after his recent southern campaign. The text mostly only states that the campaign will occur, to seek to complete Liú Bèi’s unfulfilled dream, without need to discuss justifications or reasoning in much detail.
Meanwhile Kè's lùn, a public argument to answer the critics of his planned second northern campaign, is focused on reason and citing historical examples as evidence. He speaks of how the Six States sat by at ease thinking the division between them was permanent, only to be conquered by Qín; of how Liú Biǎo did not attack Cáo Cāo when Cāo was still weak and small, only to be conquered by a powerful Cáo Cāo later. He discusses the ancient war between the southeastern states of Wú and Yuè, and how Wú sat by as Yuè spent twenty years building its strength to finally conquer Wú. Next he warns that the Wú Empire, even counting the alliance with Shǔ-Hàn, was still smaller than the Six States put together, while facing an enemy Wèi many times larger than Qín. But there was a brief window of opportunity for Wú: Wèi’s population had been weakened by the past decades of warfare, but as the next generation grew up, Wèi’s population would be restored and the window would close on Wú. In the long term, Wèi would only grow more powerful and Wú would only grow weaker. The only hope for Wú was to seize the initiative while it still could.
There is no digression into appraising officials or reminiscing on personal relationships, and Kè’s own feelings are generally left untouched until the later parts, where Zhūgě Kè speaks of his own growing anxiety for the future of Wú, and how his own personal feelings are so small in comparison: if Wú should fall, even if he should cut his own throat in shame, what use what it be? Kè’s remark is a far more striking statement than Liàng’s closing statements of how he has been moved to tears by the trust and responsibility that Liú Bèi and Liú Shàn have placed in him. It reminds everyone that the cause is much more than the feelings of one old man, it is about the fate of the empire.
I suppose there is some room for debate based on personal opinions as to what should be considered good rhetoric, but for me, I go with giving the point to Kè.
Northern Campaigns
Zhūgě Liàng led five northern campaigns. The first two ended in humiliating defeats that forced Zhūgě Liàng to publicly demote himself for the failures. The third was a limited success, and though the fourth saw initial successes it was ultimately forced to turn back due to supply difficulties. The fifth ended with Liàng’s own death, and further almost resulted in disaster as Liàng’s subordinates fought for authority in the power vacuum.42 Zhūgě Kè only led two northern campaigns before his assassination, but the first was a great victory, and the second was defeated by disease and logistics against a target that had repulsed many of Zhūgě Kè’s predecessors.43
This comparison is admittedly difficult due the very different circumstances and the fact that Liàng got off five campaigns before his death while Kè only got off two, but I’d still give the point to Kè. None of Liàng’s five campaigns really match in scale of victory to Kè’s first campaign. Furthermore, had Zhūgě Kè not been assassinated, very likely his future northern campaigns would have been more successful. One of Zhūgě Liàng’s admitted weaknesses was difficulty in adapting his strategy to changing circumstances.44 Meanwhile, Kè demonstrated flexibility in his differing strategies between his first and second northern campaigns, and he further learned enough from the setbacks of the second to adopt another new strategy for his planned third.45 There is also of course the possibility of taking advantage of unrest in Wèi: had Zhūgě Kè been alive for the Shòuchūn uprisings, he would most likely have been able to intervene far more successfully than Sūn Jùn or Sūn Chēn (assuming of course that the uprisings would still have happened in such a timeline; Zhūgě Kè’s continued survival would have no doubt influenced the political situation in Wèi).
Undone by Success
The defeat at Héfēi Xīnchéng need not have led to Zhūgě Kè’s destruction. After all, Zhūgě Liàng was humiliated in his first and second northern campaigns, and Sīmǎ Shī was humiliated by Zhūgě Kè in the Dōngxíng campaign. Yet neither Liàng nor Shī were destroyed by their failures (though Sīmǎ Shī did come rather close; more on that later). Why was this?
What Zhūgě Liàng and Sīmǎ Shī knew to do was to admit defeat and accept the responsibility and punishment. Following his first defeat, Zhūgě Liàng demoted himself and executed his subordinate officer Mǎ Sù, with whom he was personally close, as an apology.46 When Sīmǎ Shī was defeated and it was proposed that the various Wèi officers be punished for their failures, Sīmǎ Shī refused and took the blame himself, restricting punishments to only his younger brother Sīmǎ Zhāo.47
In contrast, there is no record of Zhūgě Kè taking similar actions. If anything, it appears he may have refused to acknowledge defeat or even shifted blame onto others. Even after withdrawing from Xīnchéng, he attempted to continue the campaign by building up garrison farms to regroup, and had to be explicitly summoned back by repeated Imperial Orders. Following his return, he increased strictness and ordered the dismissal, replacement, and reprimanding of many subordinate officials and officers. This might have been intended to punish poor performance, improve the bureaucratic organization, and remove bureaucratic obstacles to his goals to continue his campaigns (such as the series of Imperial Orders that had summoned him back), but it could not have but been poorly received after the setback at Xīnchéng.
What Kè should have done was to follow the example of his uncle in Shǔ and enemy in Wèi: acknowledge the setbacks, take the blame onto himself, show sympathy for subordinates, and win their continued support through active displays of humility. If he had done this, then perhaps he would have been able to survive and make a turn-around, as Zhūgě Liàng had done before and Sīmǎ Shī would do after.
But he did not know to do this, because, tragically, he did not know how to lose. Prior to his defeat at Héféi Xīnchéng, Zhūgě Kè had gone from victory to victory, triumph to triumph. He had surpassed both his father Jǐn and his uncle Liàng in rank, prestige, achievements, and glory. He had decisively defeated and humiliated his enemy counterpart Sīmǎ Shī. Defeat was alien to Zhūgě Kè, and so when faced with a setback, he did not know how to react, made the wrong moves, and ended in disaster.
The Assassination of Zhūgě Kè by the Coward Sūn Jùn is a story that warns of the dangers of too much success. High achievements can lead to overconfidence, arrogance, alienation of others, loss of perspective, so that when the first setback appears, the whole thing can come crashing down, and a great hero can be brought down by a petty man. And when it does come crashing down, rather tragically, posterity never forgives you for it, and remembers you more for your downfall than for your triumphs.
諸葛太傅才氣幹略,宣文忠武,然而剛愎自用,功高震主,只知勝而不知敗,是以終於為豎子所害,哀哉!48
I really need to start talking about less interesting/thoroughly recorded people, or else these are just going to keep getting longer and longer… Well, I’m open to suggestions:
SGZ 64: 初,恪將征淮南,有孝子著縗衣入其閤中,從者白之,令外詰問,孝子曰:「不自覺入。」時中外守備,亦悉不見,眾皆異之。出行之後,所坐廳事屋棟中折。自新城出住東興,有白虹見其船,還拜蔣陵,白虹復繞其車。
SGZ 64: 恪將見之夜,精爽擾動,通夕不寐。明將盥漱,聞水腥臭,侍者授衣,衣服亦臭。恪怪其故,易衣易水,其臭如初,意惆悵不悅。嚴畢趨出,犬銜引其衣,恪曰:「犬不欲我行乎?」還坐,頃刻乃復起,犬又銜其衣,恪令從者逐犬,遂升車。
SGZ 64: 及將見,駐車宮門,峻已伏兵於帷中,恐恪不時入,事泄,自出見恪曰:「使君若尊體不安,自可須後,峻當具白主上。」欲以嘗知恪。恪答曰:「當自力入。」散騎常侍張約、朱恩等密書與恪曰:「今日張設非常,疑有他故。」恪省書而去。未出路門,逢太常滕胤。
SGZ 64: 恪曰:「卒腹痛,不任入。」胤不知峻陰計,謂恪曰:「君自行旋未見,今上置酒請君,君已至門,宜當力進。」
Annotated to SGZ 64: 吳歷曰:張約、朱恩密疏告恪,恪以示滕胤,胤勸恪還,恪曰:「峻小子何能為邪!但恐因酒食中人耳。」乃以藥酒入。孫盛評曰:恪與胤親厚,約等疏,非常大事,勢應示胤,共謀安危。然恪性強梁,加素侮峻,自不信,故入,豈胤微勸,便為之冒禍乎?吳歷為長。
The special honor 劍履上殿 “with sword and shoes ascend the palace hall” appears to have begun with Xiāo Hé during early Hàn; see Shǐ jì 53.
SGZ 64: 恪躊躇而還,劍履上殿,謝亮,還坐。設酒,恪疑未飲,峻因曰:「使君病未善平,當有常服藥酒,自可取之。」恪意乃安,別飲所齎酒。〔一〕酒數行,亮還內。
SGZ 64: 峻起如廁,解長衣,著短服,出曰:「有詔收諸葛恪!」 There is an alternative account in Wú lù that claims that Sūn Liàng was present and shouted “Not my doing!” before being led back inside by his wet nurse. The historian Péi Sōngzhī argues that this is very implausible, and Sūn Jùn certainly would have waited until after Sūn Liàng had left before acting: 吳錄曰:峻提刀稱詔收恪,亮起立曰:「非我所為!非我所為!」乳母引亮還內。吳歷云:峻先引亮入,然後出稱詔。與本傳同。臣松之以為峻欲稱詔,宜如本傳及吳歷,不得如吳錄所言。
SGZ 64: 恪驚起,拔劍未得,而峻刀交下。張約從旁斫峻,裁傷左手,峻應手斫約,斷右臂。武衛之士皆趨上殿,峻云:「所取者恪也,今已死。」悉令復刃,乃除地更飲。
Annotated to SGZ 64: 吳錄曰:恪時年五十一。 Fifty-one in traditional reckoning would be about fifty in modern reckoning.
Annotated to SGZ 64: 搜神記曰:恪入,已被殺,其妻在室,〔語〕使婢(語)曰:「汝何故血臭?」婢曰:「不也。」有頃愈劇,又問婢曰:「汝眼目視瞻,何以不常?」婢蹷然起躍,頭至于棟,攘臂切齒而言曰:「諸葛公乃為孫峻所殺!」於是大小知恪死矣,而吏兵尋至。
SGZ 64: 中子竦,長水校尉。少子建,步兵校尉。聞恪誅,車載其母而走。峻遣騎督劉承追斬竦於白都。建得渡江,欲北走魏,行數十里,為追兵所逮。恪外甥都鄉侯張震及常侍朱恩等,皆夷三族。
SGZ 52: 恪既誅,遣無難督施寬就將軍施績、孫壹、全熙等取融。融卒聞兵士至,惶懼猶豫,不能決計,兵到圍城,飲藥而死,三子皆伏誅。
SGZ 64: 恪誅後,孫峻忌友,欲以為鬱林太守,友發病憂死。 The phrase 憂死 “die in anxiety” is often a euphemism for a pressured suicide.
SGZ 64: 既誅諸葛恪,遷丞相大將軍,督中外諸軍事,假節,進封富春侯。滕胤以恪子竦妻父辭位,峻曰:「鯀禹罪不相及,滕侯何為?」峻、胤雖內不沾洽,而外相包容,進胤爵高密侯,共事如前。
Annotated to SGZ 64: 吳錄曰:群臣上奏,共推峻為太尉,議胤為司徒。時有媚峻者,以為大統宜在公族,若滕胤為亞公,聲名素重,眾心所附,不可貳也。乃表以峻為丞相,又不置御史大夫,士人皆失望矣。
SGZ 64: 峻素無重名,驕矜險害,多所刑殺,百姓囂然。又姦亂宮人,與公主魯班私通。五鳳元年,吳侯英謀殺峻,英事泄死。 SGZ 64: 將軍孫儀、張怡、林恂等欲因會殺峻。事泄,儀等自殺,死者數十人,并及公主魯育。
See the biography of Guànqiū Jiǎn in SGZ 28, Sūn Jùn in SGZ 64.
SGZ 64: 峻與胤至石頭,因餞之,領從者百許人入據營。據御軍齊整,峻惡之,稱心痛去,遂夢為諸葛恪所擊,恐懼發病死,時年三十八,以後事付綝。
SGZ 48, 64.
Annotated to SGZ 59: 江表傳曰:登使侍中胡綜作賓友目曰:「英才卓越,超踰倫匹,則諸葛恪。精識時機,達幽究微,則顧譚。凝辨宏達,言能釋結,則謝景。究學甄微,游夏同科,則范慎。」茞乃私駁綜曰:「元遜才而疏,子嘿精而狠,叔發辨而浮,孝敬深而狹。」
SGZ 59: 諸葛恪才略博達,器任佐時。
Annotated to SGZ 15: 又嘗對司馬大將軍料諸葛恪雖得勝於邊土,見誅不久。大將軍問其故,緝云:「威震其主,功蓋一國,欲不死可得乎?」及恪從合肥還,吳果殺之。
SGZ 28: 諸葛恪圍合肥新城,不克,退歸。艾言景王曰:「孫權已沒,大臣未附,吳名宗大族,皆有部曲,阻兵仗勢,足以建命。恪新秉國政,而內無其主,不念撫恤上下以立根基,競於外事,虐用其民,悉國之眾,頓於堅城,死者萬數,載禍而歸,此恪獲罪之日也。昔子胥、吳起、商鞅、樂毅皆見任時君,主沒而敗。況恪才非四賢,而不慮大患,其亡可待也。」恪歸,果見誅。
SGZ 64: 休恥與峻、綝同族。特除其屬籍,稱之曰故峻、故綝云。休又下詔曰:「諸葛恪、滕胤、呂據蓋以無罪為峻、綝兄弟所見殘害,可為痛心,促皆改葬,各為祭奠。其罹恪等事見遠徙者,一切召還。」
SGZ 35: 喬字伯松,亮兄瑾之第二子也,本字仲慎。與兄元遜俱有名於時,論者以為喬才不及兄,而性業過之。初,亮未有子,求喬為嗣,瑾啟孫權遣喬來西,亮以喬為己適子,故易其字焉。拜為駙馬都尉,隨亮至漢中。年二十五,建興六年卒。子攀,官至行護軍翊武將軍,亦早卒。諸葛恪見誅於吳,子孫皆盡,而亮自有冑裔,故攀還復為瑾後。
Annotated to SGZ 64: 江表傳曰:朝臣有乞為恪立碑以銘其勳績者,博士盛沖以為不應。孫休曰:「盛夏出軍,士卒傷損,無尺寸之功,不可謂能;受託孤之任,死於豎子之手,不可謂智。沖議為是。」遂寢。
SGZ 64: 諸葛恪才氣幹略,邦人所稱,然驕且吝,周公無觀,況在於恪?矜己陵人,能無敗乎!若躬行所與陸遜及弟融之書,則悔吝不至,何尤禍之有哉?
Sānguó Yǎnyì chapter 43.
From a very popular anonymous criticism of the TV series Sherlock (2010), which begins: “Why does nobody like Sherlock? Because it has smart characters written stupidly.”
Hàn shū 19: 相國、丞相,皆秦官,金印紫綬,掌丞天子助理萬機。
Hòu Hàn shū (HHS) 124: 太傅,上公一人。本注曰:掌以善導,無常職。
The HHS treatises on the bureaucracy lists Grand Tutor first.
SGZ 13.
SGZ 4, JS 1.
SGZ 32: 章武元年夏四月,大赦,改年。以諸葛亮為丞相,許靖為司徒。
許嵩《建康實錄》卷十:建興元年、加恪都督中外諸軍事、荊揚二州牧、丞相、陽都侯。
Annotated to SGZ 35: 南中平,皆即其渠率而用之。或以諫亮,亮曰:「若留外人,則當留兵,兵留則無所食,一不易也;加夷新傷破,父兄死喪,留外人而無兵者,必成禍患,二不易也;又夷累有廢殺之罪,自嫌釁重,若留外人,終不相信,三不易也;今吾欲使不留兵,不運糧,而綱紀粗定,夷、漢粗安故耳。」
See the biographies of Lǐ Huī, Lǚ Kǎi, and Mǎ Zhōng in SGZ 43.
SGZ 64.
See SGZ 35 for Zhūgě Liàng’s biǎo, SGZ 64 for Zhūgě Kè's lùn.
SGZ 35, SGZ 40.
See SGZ 26 and SGZ 47 for accounts of other failed Wú campaigns against Héféi Xīnchéng.
See the appraisal of Zhūgě Liàng and the annotated additional appraisals, all at the end of SGZ 35. Even the very pro-Liàng arguments admit a lack of flexibility, though they re-interpret this as a good thing: Liàng understood his own weaknesses and therefore stuck to his strengths.
SGZ 64: 復敕兵嚴,欲向青、徐。
SGZ 35.
SGZ 4, JS 2.
Grand Tutor Zhūgě [Kè] had talent and spirit, competence and strategy, expansively cultured, loyally martial, however he was stubborn and self-confident, his high achievements disturbed his master, he only understood victory and did not understand defeat, so that in the end he was killed by a petty fellow, a tragedy!