Tl;dr: Wèi.
I’ve changed my mind on many of my old opinions, but I probably won’t be changing my mind about this one any time soon, if ever.
Legitimacy is Important
I suspect that one contributing reason for the enduring popularity of the Three States period is the open question on political legitimacy. The question “which of the Three States was the rightful successor to Hàn” is not merely a casual question of opinion. It touches on a very important question that will haunt us all for as long as there are such things as states and governments: what gives the state its right to rule?
How exactly can we determine which regime was the legitimate successor to Hàn? Thankfully, the historiography records a very clear answer:
Shǔ jì states:
Wèi Míng-dì [Cáo Ruì] asked [Huáng] Quán: “The world is divided in three, how is one to know which land is the correct successor?”
[Huáng] Quán said: “One should consult astrology for the correct successor. Previously Yínghuò [Mars] guarded Xīn [constellation] and Wén Huángdì [Cáo Pī] passed away; the two rulers of Wú and Shǔ were at peace. This is the sign.”1
So there you have it, an omen in the skies told us that Wèi was the correct successor to Hàn.
But seriously, let’s take a look at the basics of the three claims.
The Three Claims
In 213, Wèi was established as a fief state under Hàn, and in 220, the claim to Imperial legitimacy was made in a formal abdication ceremony in which Hàn transferred its power to Wèi.
As news of the claim of a transition of power spread, the rival regime in the southwestern Shǔ geographic region claimed that they would take up and continue the reign of Hàn, issuing their formal claim in an Imperial ascension ceremony in 221.
The regimes in the southeastern Wú geographic region and northeastern Yān geographic region acknowledged Wèi’s claim at first. The regime in the southeast in particular was rewarded with the formal establishment of a Wú fief state under Wèi in 221, but as further negotiations broke down, Wú formally split off from Wèi in 222 by establishing their own calendar system, and in 229, the Wú regime made its own claim to direct succession to Hàn in an Imperial ascension ceremony.
Wèi
The arguments for Wèi’s claim are perhaps the most straightforward and the most thoroughly recorded.2 The centerpiece of the claim was the abdication ceremony where Hàn symbolically transferred its power to Wèi.
Of course, the abdication itself had to be justified as a natural inevitability merely formalizing a process that was already occurring. There were citations of various omens and portents and prophecies, as was customary, as these were considered to be examples of nature itself responding to the transfer of power. As the documents leading up to the abdication noted, it had already been obvious to many observers that Hàn was in decline as far back as the reign of Hàn Ān-dì (Liú Hù), r. 106-125, roughly a century before, a decline that culminated in the outbreak of civil war in 190.
Then, amid the civil war, a comparatively lesser warlord, Cáo Cāo,3 rose to power, taking custody of the Hàn Imperial Court in 196, and by 208 his regime had conquered most of the central plains of the Huáng (Yellow) river valley, the heartlands of the Hàn Empire. In 213 Cáo Cāo’s personal power was formalized with the foundation of the Wèi fief state with himself as its head, and by the time of Cáo Cāo’s death in 220, the Wèi regime was already receiving petitions to formalize the transfer of power that seemed already obvious to many.
Cáo Cāo refused these petitions, for a number of reasons to be discussed at a later time, and died a formal subject of Hàn in early 220, his title as ruler of the Wèi fief state passing to his eldest surviving son Cáo Pī. The petitions for a formal transfer of power were renewed, and Cáo Pī accepted, the ceremonial abdication of the Hàn Emperor Liú Xié to the new Wèi Emperor Cáo Pī taking place near the end of that same year. As argued in the abdication documents, Hàn had been in decline for a nearly a century and all but collapsed already in 190, that it was by the achievements of Cáo Cāo and his followers that order had been restored in the Imperial heartlands, and so it was obvious to all that Hàn’s power had already passed to Wèi.
Shǔ-Hàn
Shǔ-Hàn claimed to be the Hàn dynasty continued. The state called itself Hàn; the prefix Shǔ is a term for disambiguation used by later historians, a geographic name for the southwestern region in which the regime was based. Opponents of Shǔ-Hàn used the name Shǔ in order to dismiss the claims to continue Hàn.4
That Hàn had been in obvious decline for a century was not a problem for Shǔ-Hàn’s attempt to continue Hàn; Shǔ-Hàn could simply claim to be an internal restoration that was ending the decline. There was in fact already a precedent for this within Hàn itself. Hàn had suffered a period of serious decline nearly two centuries before, beginning about the time of Yuán-dì (Liú Shì), reigning 48 - 33 BC. Those decades of decline had culminated in a declared end of Hàn and the beginning of a successor state of Xīn in 8 AD, but following a period of civil war and the collapse of the Xīn state, a distant cadet of the Liú family, Guāng-Wǔ (Liú Xiù), declared a restoration of Hàn in 25 AD, following a simple and commonly accepted idea: when the main line of descent fails, the succession passes to a cadet branch. “Hàn” was therefore in fact two separate phases of about two hundred years each, Former Hàn established by the original founder Liú Bāng and Later Hàn established by the “second founder” Liú Xiù.
The basis for Shǔ-Hàn’s claim to continue Hàn was that its leader, Liú Bèi, the warlord who had conquered the Shǔ region about 214, was a male-line descendant of Liú Bāng and thus a cadet of the Imperial Liú family. If Liú Xiù could be a “second founder” to restore a fallen Hàn to continue it another two hundred years, then surely Liú Bèi could be the “third founder” who would achieve a second revival and extend Hàn into yet a third phase of two hundred years.
Of course, the family connection could not be the only basis for the claim, since the lineage was not exactly exclusive. Even at the first restoration of Hàn, Liú Xiù had been forced to battle several distant Liú cousins who were making alternative claims to restore Hàn. Perhaps notably, Liú Bèi himself was not a descendant of Guāng-Wǔ (Liú Xiù, r. 25 - 57 AD); Liú Bèi’s connection to the ruling line instead stretched further back to Jǐng-dì (Liú Qǐ, r. 157 - 141 BC) of some three centuries earlier. If family connection was the only basis, then there were potentially thousands of other Liú family members, some even descended from Liú Xiù and thus more closely related to the main ruling line through Later Hàn.
Instead Liú Bèi’s claim also had to be supplemented by the idea that he was a worthy ruler, that worthiness distinguishing himself from the countless other members of the extended Liú family spread across the empire, and of course distinguishing him from the unworthy Wèi regime that had usurped the rightful rule of Hàn. The documents surrounding Liú Bèi’s Imperial ascension ceremony5 cite omens and portents as evidence of nature itself approving of his worthiness, and further denounce Cáo Cāo and Cáo Pī as unworthy and evil usurpers, stating that with the Imperial throne left empty by Cáo Pī’s illegal removal of Liú Xié, it fell on Liú Bèi to fill its vacancy to continue Hàn.
Wú
The basis for Wú’s claim is perhaps the most “eccentric” of the three. Whereas Wèi could claim to have inherited its legitimacy from Hàn with a formal abdication ceremony in 220, and Shǔ-Hàn could claim to have continued Hàn based on family inheritance with a formal ascension ceremony in 221, Wú would have to take a different approach, and furthermore did not formally issue its Imperial claim until 229.
About 195, the young warlord Sūn Cè began a series of campaigns to conquer the region about the lower Yángzǐ river, and though he was assassinated in 200, he was succeeded by his younger brother Sūn Quán, who maintained and expanded the state upstream along the Yángzǐ river and southward into the Zhū (Pearl) river valley and Hóng (Red) river valley. By 220, Sūn Quán had been in control of the southeastern region of the Hàn Empire for about two decades, and his rule over the southeast received formal endorsement in 221 by Wèi’s establishment of the Wú fief state.6
When Wú broke with Wèi in 222, already there were discussions in Sūn Quán’s Court on the feasibility of making a claim for Imperial title, but it was only in 229 that Sūn Quán felt stable enough in his power to make the claim. The argument advanced was that Hàn had indeed already ended (dismissing Shǔ-Hàn’s claim to continuation out of hand), but as Wèi was unworthy and evil, forcefully ending Hàn in a usurpation, Wèi could not be considered a legitimate successor. The Imperial throne had therefore been left empty of a legitimate occupant, and so it had come to Sūn Quán, the only worthy ruler, to fill the vacancy.7 As usual, omens and portents were cited as natural evidence of Wú’s worthiness and rightful inheritance of Hàn’s mandate.
And the Legitimate Successor is…
Wèi.
Here are the principles underlying the reason why:
Legitimacy is determined retroactively.
Continuity is important.
Had Wèi or Shǔ-Hàn or Wú conquered all the empire, then there would have been no question at all regarding legitimate succession, but as none of the three achieved full unification, the question remains open. Jìn did unify the empire and was without a serious rival claim (at least for a few decades), so there is no question that Jìn had the legitimate succession. From this, one can see that point 1 holds: legitimacy is determined retroactively. The legitimacy of Jìn is ultimately due to the end state of unity, and the questions of legitimacy for the Three States are due their end states of disunity, not due to the initial states of when the regimes were actually founded.
This is not to state that initial states are not important, merely that end states matter more. Initial states are still important, because initial states determine point 2, the extent of government continuity.
There are three possible narratives:
Hàn → Wèi → Jìn
Hàn (+ Shǔ-Hàn) → Jìn
Hàn → Wú → Jìn
At a first glance, the Hàn → Wú → Jìn narrative might appear the most attractive, since it is the one where the retroactive justification of unification is most obvious. Jìn was not really legitimate until 280, when it finally conquered Wú. Yet this narrative has perhaps had the fewest supporters over the centuries, because of the critical weakness of the Hàn → Wú step. There is almost no continuity between the Hàn and Wú regimes.
“The throne is empty, so it passes to us, as we are the only worthy rulers available” is a somewhat difficult position to argue. The idea of “worthiness” to rule necessarily appears in all three competing claims: “worthiness” of Wèi is supposed to be why Hàn abdicated to Wèi, and “worthiness” is supposed to be why Liú Bèi’s branch of the family should be the one to inherit and continue Hàn as opposed to the numerous other cadet branches. Wú’s claim is fundamentally a negative argument: Wèi is unworthy and Shǔ-Hàn cannot continue something that has already ended, which leaves Wú as the only candidate left. Perhaps if Wú had won all the empire, the argument could work retroactively, but Wú did not win the empire, so the argument breaks down, and only emphasizes the lack of continuity between Hàn and Wú.
The Hàn (+ Shǔ-Hàn) → Jìn narrative is certainly attractive to some; in fact it’s probably been considered the “correct” succession line in popular imagination for the last eight or nine hundred years or so. There are numerous reasons for this. The narrative is popular for any regime claiming to be a “rightful government in exile.” The story of the secret rightful heir returning to the throne is a popular trope, especially in fantasy stories. Even astrologers and believers in calender calculations can enjoy the ability to cleanly count years directly from Shǔ-Hàn’s reign to Jìn’s reign.8
The critical weakness in the narrative is in the “Hàn (+ Shǔ-Hàn)” part: can Shǔ-Hàn really be called a continuation of Hàn when there is almost no continuity between the Later Hàn regime and the Shǔ-Hàn regime? In the transition between the Former Hàn and Later Hàn regimes, Liú Xiù was able to conquer the Former Hàn empire and thus absorbed many Former Hàn and even Xīn officials into the new government, maintaining some degree of continuity. Shǔ-Hàn however was limited to the Shǔ region, with no real contact with the Later Hàn Court.
Hàn → Wèi → Jìn is the most orderly narrative with the most continuity. The future Wèi regime took custody of the Hàn Court in 196 and absorbed some of the Hàn officials, and the Jìn regime was founded by a faction within the Wèi Court. Since the foundations for Jìn were laid under Wèi, the alternative Hàn → Jìn and Wú → Jìn narratives would be tantamount to discrediting the achievements of the early contributors to the future Jìn regime. Though Jìn achieved its full legitimacy in 280 by conquering Wú, it already had some legitimacy from the continuity of government through Hàn and Wèi.
Just because you’re legitimate doesn’t mean I have to like it
I sympathize with those who would argue for the Hàn (+ Shǔ-Hàn) → Jìn and Hàn → Wú → Jìn narratives. My concern is that many of those who make those arguments might be heavily influenced by personal dislike of Wèi. There are of course plenty of reasons to criticize Wèi and to favor Shǔ-Hàn or Wú (or not). Yet I do not believe that dislike of Wèi or positive feeling for Shǔ-Hàn or Wú is really all that relevant to the question of legitimacy.
I have very strong personal dislike for the early Jìn regime, and am hugely critical of how they took power (I’ll probably talk a bit about that in the future). But just because I don’t like them doesn’t mean I can deny their legitimacy.
On the flip side, they can be legitimate, but I don’t have to like it.9 More on that later.
In the meantime, don’t forget to share this with people who argue for Shǔ-Hàn or Wú legitimacy to let them know that they’re wrong.
蜀記曰:魏明帝問權:「天下鼎立,當以何地為正?」權對曰:「當以天文為正。往者熒惑守心而文皇帝崩,吳、蜀二主平安,此其徵也。」 From Péi Sōngzhī’s annotations to Sān Guó zhì (SGZ) 43. Note that the Treatise on Heaven’s Signs (astrology) in Jìn shū (JS) 13 claims that there is no record of Yínghuò guarding the Xīn constellation around this time, and suspects it is an error for the record of Yínghuò entering the Tàiwēi constellation in Huángchū Sixth Year Fifth Moon Rénxū (225 July 9th).
Annotations to SGZ 2 include quotations of several texts leading up to the abdication ceremony from Liú Xié to Cáo Pī. For an English language study of the documents and the abdication, see Howard L. Goodman, Ts’ao P’i Transcendent.
Cáo Cāo has annals in SGZ 1. See also an English language biography by Rafe de Crespigny, Imperial Warlord. Alternatively, if you want to give me pizza money, buy The Annals of Wei (I get a cut on every sale).
For a more thorough discussion see J. Michael Farmer, What's in a Name? On the Appellative "Shu" in Early Medieval Chinese Historiography.
The base text to SGZ 32 include quotations from petitions for Liú Bèi to take the throne and from Liú Bèi’s ascension ceremony. For an English translation of SGZ 32, see William Gordon Crowell, Record of The Three Kingdoms: The History of Shu, Fascicle Two: “The Former Lord.”
Sūn Cè has biography in SGZ 46, Sūn Quán in SGZ 47.
The official documents of the Imperial ascension ceremony are preserved in Wú lù and annotated to SGZ 47.
Traditional Chinese counting of years lacks an epoch in the style of anno Domini of the Gregorian calendar; years are instead organized by dynastic states and “Year Names” issued by reigning sovereigns. Therefore, support for one state’s claim to legitimacy over another can be reflected on decisions on how years are counted. Since Liú Bèi made his claim relatively quickly after Liú Xié’s abdication, and the Wèi-Jìn abdication ceremony occurred relatively quickly after Wèi's conquest of Shǔ-Hàn, it is possible to use a counting of reign years that omits Wèi entirely and goes directly from Hàn (+ Shǔ-Hàn) to Jìn. Xí Zuòchǐ’s (d. 384) Hàn Jìn Chūnqiū was famously structured around this Hàn to Jìn year counting. In contrast, Wú suffers from overlaps, with Wú beginning use of its own Year Names in 222 and ending in 280, leading to gaps against the end of Hàn’s Year Names in 220 and the beginning of Jìn’s Year Names in 265.
According to JS 77, Wú officer Zhūgě Jìng, after Wú’s surrender to Jìn, not only refused employment from Jìn but also refused to even sit facing the direction toward the Jìn Court.