The final conquest of Shǔ-Hàn by Wèi was led primarily by two officers, Dèng Ài and Zhōng Huì,1 and in the immediate aftermath of the conquest, both were honored with the highest offices and rewards, but both died violently before the bestowals arrived.2
Following the surrender of the claimant Hàn Emperor, Liú Shàn, Dèng Ài had occupied the former Shǔ-Hàn capital of Chéngdū and taken the authority to appoint his own associates and subordinates to take over many of the local government.3 Sīmǎ Zhāo, the de facto regent and real power over Wèi, sent letters insisting that the matters of the southwest must be first reported and granted approval before being enacted, but Dèng Ài replied that his seizure of power was necessary given the situation. Zhōng Huì and other officers then reported against Dèng Ài as appearing as if preparing to rebel, leading to orders for Dèng Ài’s arrest.4 After Dèng Ài was arrested and sent from Chéngdū in a prisoner’s cart, Zhōng Huì arrived in Chéngdū and attempted to build a coalition of the surrendered Shǔ officers and the Wèi officers to rebel against Sīmǎ Zhāo. The Wèi troops refused to go along with the plan and mutinied against Zhōng Huì, and in the resulting chaos both Zhōng Huì and Dèng Ài were killed.5 This incident that has often been called “Zhōng Huì’s rebellion.”6
As such a name implies, much of the blame for the incident has tended to focus on Zhōng Huì alone, and there has been perhaps a natural tendency to view Dèng Ài as almost an innocent victim in the whole situation, a view no doubt helped by the fact that the Jìn regime under Sīmǎ Yán ordered a partial posthumous rehabilitation for Dèng Ài in 273.7 Indeed, some parts of the extant historiography seem to push forward the possibility that Zhōng Huì intentionally sought to frame Dèng Ài in order to remove him and concentrate power himself.8
Yet it is perhaps important to remember that claims of Dèng Ài’s innocence are no doubt colored by the natural wish to assign all the blame to Zhōng Huì. The decision to order the arrest of one of the most senior officers of the Wèi army, and so soon after a monumental triumph by that officer, could not have been made lightly, and certainly could not have occurred “only” by the machinations of a rival senior officer. Indeed, the historiography records that several other senior officers such as Hú Liè and Shī Zuǎn also reported against Dèng Ài.9
Lest anyone get any ideas on some sort of coordinated conspiracy in support of Zhōng Huì’s plans, it is perhaps worth mentioning that Hú Liè was later imprisoned by Zhōng Huì for refusing to cooperate with Huì’s plans and Hú Liè’s son and troops played a leading role in attacking and killing Zhōng Huì during their efforts to rescue Hú Liè,10 and Shī Zuǎn was Dèng Ài’s own subordinate officer and killed together with Dèng Ài in the chaos.11
So, before Zhōng Huì’s rebellion cast a shadow on everything else, at the time leading up to Dèng Ài’s arrest, there probably were quite a few serious negative views of Dèng Ài’s behavior and conduct, enough to lead to the orders for his arrest. And, the historiography does provide a few anecdotes that perhaps give some insight into what sort of things Dèng Ài may have done that could be considered the “wrong moves” in retrospect.
Building a Power Base
For starters, there was the previously mentioned issue of Dèng Ài issuing orders and appointments without authorization from the central government controlled by Sīmǎ Zhāo. Immediately after Liú Shàn’s surrender, Dèng Ài ordered that Liú Shàn and his senior government officials be rewarded by their surrender with high appointments. Liú Shàn in particular was honored with acting authority as a “Elite Cavalry General,” which one may note was technically a higher rank than Dèng Ài’s own rank at the time as Campaigning West General. Dèng Ài also had his subordinate officer Shī Zuǎn installed as Inspector of Yì province, essentially giving one of his own subordinate officers censorial authority over all the former territory of Shǔ-Hàn, and installed other subordinates to take over the local administration of the former prefecture units.12
It may be worth mentioning that by one account, when Zhōng Huì sought to rebel, he declared himself Governor of Yì province, giving himself executive authority over the former territory of Shǔ-Hàn.13
When Dèng Ài received criticisms for usurping authority from the central government, he defended his conduct by citing old quotations from the classics on the importance of expedience in military affairs, and further argued that they must fortify and build up strength in the Shǔ region in order to face the still unresolved problem of Wú in the southeast, and many modern readers are perhaps quick to take his written self-defenses at face-value. And yet one should perhaps remember that Dèng Ài’s biographical entry is classified together with a certain other figure named Zhūgě Dàn, a figure recorded as requesting reinforcements and permission to expand fortifications in his power base in Huáinán, under the excuse of building up strength against Wú, only to lead a rebellion from that power base.14
The biographical entry of Dèng Ài also records two alleged quotations that he made to the scholar-officials of Shǔ:
You sirs were fortunate to encounter me, and therefore were only able to have a today. If you had encountered Wú Hàn’s sort, you would already be exterminated!
Jiāng Wéi surely was the whole era’s imposing boy, but he only happened to face me, and therefore failed.15
The first quote references the story of Wú Hàn’s conquest of Gōngsūn Shù at the end of the chaos of the Former Hàn-Xīn-Later Hàn transition. Gōngsūn Shù was the last major warlord remaining against the Later Hàn regime of Liú Xiù, and had also been based in southwestern Yì province in roughly the same region as Shǔ-Hàn. When Liú Xiù’s senior officer Wú Hàn conquered the region and captured Chéngdū, he had the Gōngsūn clan and the senior officials of Gōngsūn Shù’s regime completely slaughtered, and let loose his troops to plunder and loot and burn down all of Gōngsūn Shù's palaces in Chéngdū. (The Emperor Liú Xiù reportedly flew into a rage upon hearing of what Wú Hàn had done.)16
If the anecdote is true, Dèng Ài was, in effect, telling the former Shǔ officials that they owned their lives to him. And while it certainly is true that sparing the lives of the surrendered officers and officials of Shǔ was certainly more humane than what Wú Hàn had done (or to use more recent examples, what Xiàhóu Yuān had done to the followers of Sòng Jiān or Sīmǎ Yì had done to the followers of Gōngsūn Yuān), to so crassly emphasize the the fact probably did not go over well, especially if any rumor of that managed to spread north to reach the ears of Sīmǎ Zhāo. After all, the records of Zhūgě Dàn emphasize that Dàn had worked quite hard to build up a loyal following of men who believed they owed their lives to him.17
Building the Tower
But the single anecdote that is the most shocking and baffling to me personally is the one that gives its name to this article.
There is a line from the biographical entry of Dèng Ài that has unfortunately been frequently quoted out of context:
The soldiers that died in service were all with the Shǔ troops together buried.
Many modern commentators, due to lacking context, have assumed this statement to be an indication that Dèng Ài sought some sort of reconciliation and a healing of the conflict through shared burial. The vital piece of context is where they were buried.
The full quote is properly:
[Dèng Ài] ordered for Miánzhú to build a terrace into a Mound Tower, used to make manifest the battle achievements. The soldiers that died in service were all with the Shǔ troops together buried.18
A “Mound Tower” 京觀 is a monument built out of the dead bodies of enemy armies, constructed with the intention of commemorating victory in battle.19
Some might argue that these are supposed to be two separate sentences describing two separate events, one discussing the Shǔ dead being used to build a Mound Tower, and another discussing a separate burial of Wèi troops and Shǔ troops, based on the logic that if they are supposed to be a single event, the phrases would be in reverse order, saying something like “the soldiers were buried with the Shǔ troops at Miánzhú to build a Mound Tower.” After all, the other implication is just too crazy to believe. Surely Dèng Ài would not have been so crass as to include the bodies of his own dead troops in order to make the monument to his victory even bigger, right? That would just be too crazy to believe.20
If Dèng Ài was not plotting to rebel against Sīmǎ Zhāo, then he was an absolutely terrible politician with no tact, sensitivity, or sense of the importance of optics, especially if the record of the Mound Tower is meant to be interpreted in the less flattering way. As Dèng Ài’s own biographical entry writes in the section immediately after the section relating the story of his Mound Tower and of his two alleged quotations to the Shǔ officials:
Those with wisdom laughed at him.21
A third, Zhūgě Xù, was a leading officer in the early phases of the campaign but removed from command under accusations of cowardice.
《三國志·魏書二十八·鍾會傳》四年秋,乃下詔使鄧艾、諸葛緒各統諸軍三萬餘人,艾趣甘松、沓中連綴維,緒趣武街、橋頭絕維歸路。會統十餘萬眾,分從斜谷、駱谷入。
《三國志·魏書二十八·鍾會傳》會與緒軍向劍閣,會欲專軍勢,密白緒畏懦不進,檻車徵還。
《三國志·魏書二十八·鍾會傳》初,艾為太尉,會為司徒,皆持節、都督諸軍如故,咸未受命而斃。
《三國志·魏書二十八·鄧艾傳》艾至成都,禪率太子諸王及群臣六十餘人面縛輿櫬詣軍門,艾執節解縛焚櫬,受而宥之。檢御將士,無所虜略,綏納降附,使復舊業,蜀人稱焉。輒依鄧禹故事,承制拜禪行驃騎將軍,太子奉車、諸王駙馬都尉。蜀群司各隨高下拜為王官,或領艾官屬。以師纂領益州刺史,隴西太守牽弘等領蜀中諸郡。
《三國志·魏書二十八·鄧艾傳》文王使監軍衛瓘喻艾:「事當須報,不宜輒行。」艾重言曰:「銜命征行,奉指授之策,元惡既服;至于承制拜假,以安初附,謂合權宜。今蜀舉眾歸命,地盡南海,東接吳會,宜早鎮定。若待國命,往復道途,延引日月。春秋之義,大夫出疆,有可以安社稷,利國家,專之可也。今吳未賓;勢與蜀連,不可拘常以失事機。兵法,進不求名,退不避罪,艾雖無古人之節,終不自嫌以損于國也。」鍾會、胡烈、師纂等皆白艾所作悖逆,變釁以結。詔書檻車徵艾。
《三國志·魏書二十八·鄧艾傳》艾父子旣囚,鍾會至成都,先送艾,然後作亂。會已死,艾本營將士追出艾檻車,迎還。瓘遣田續等討艾,遇於緜竹西,斬之。
《三國志·魏書二十八·鍾會傳》會以五年正月十五日至,其明日,悉請護軍、郡守、牙門騎督以上及蜀之故官,為太后發喪于蜀朝堂。矯太后遺詔,使會起兵廢文王,皆班示坐上人,使下議訖,書版署置,更使所親信代領諸軍。
《三國志·魏書二十八·鍾會傳》斯須,門外倚梯登城,或燒城屋,蟻附亂進,矢下如雨,牙門、郡守各緣屋出,與其卒兵相得。姜維率會左右戰,手殺五六人,眾既格斬維,爭赴殺會。會時年四十,將士死者數百人
https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh/锺会之乱
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhong_Hui's_Rebellion
《三國志·魏書二十八·鄧艾傳》九年,詔曰:「艾有功勳,受罪不逃刑,而子孫為民隸,朕常愍之。其以嫡孫朗為郎中。」
《三國志·魏書二十八·鍾會傳》會內有異志,因鄧艾承制專事,密白艾有反狀,於是詔書檻車徵艾。
《三國志注·魏書二十八·鍾會傳》世語曰:會善效人書,於劍閣要艾章表白事,皆易其言,令辭指悖傲,多自矜伐。又毀文王報書,手作以疑之也。
《三國志·魏書二十八·鄧艾傳》鍾會、胡烈、師纂等皆白艾所作悖逆,變釁以結。詔書檻車徵艾。
《三國志·魏書二十八·鍾會傳》會帳下督丘建本屬胡烈,烈薦之文王,會請以自隨,任愛之。建愍烈獨坐,啟會,使聽內一親兵出取飲食,諸牙門隨例各內一人。烈紿語親兵及疏與其子曰:「丘建密說消息,會已作大坑,白棓數千,欲悉呼外兵入,人賜白㡊,拜為散將,以次棓殺坑中。」諸牙門親兵亦咸說此語,一夜傳相告,皆徧。或謂會:「可盡殺牙門騎督以上。」會猶豫未決。十八日日中,烈軍兵與烈兒雷鼓出門,諸軍兵不期皆鼓譟出,曾無督促之者,而爭先赴城。
《三國志·魏書二十八·鄧艾傳》艾遣子惠唐亭侯忠等出其右,司馬師纂等出其左。
《三國志注·魏書二十八·鄧艾傳》世語曰:師纂亦與艾俱死。纂性急少恩,死之日體無完皮。
《三國志·魏書二十八·鄧艾傳》 輙依鄧禹故事,承制拜禪行驃騎將軍,太子奉車、諸王駙馬都尉。蜀群司各隨高下拜為王官,或領艾官屬。以師纂領益州刺史,隴西太守牽弘等領蜀中諸郡。
《三國志·蜀書十四·姜維傳》會既構鄧艾,艾檻車徵,因將維等詣成都,自稱益州牧以叛。
《三國志·魏書二十八·諸葛誕傳》甘露元年冬,吴賊欲向徐堨,計誕所督兵馬足以待之,而復請十萬衆守壽春,又求臨淮築城以備寇,內欲保有淮南。朝廷微知誕有自疑心,以誕舊臣,欲入度之。
《三國志·魏書二十八·鄧艾傳》艾深自矜伐,謂蜀士大夫曰:「諸君賴遭某,故得有今日耳。若遇吳漢之徒,已殄滅矣。」又曰:「姜維自一時雄兒也,與某相值,故窮耳。」
《後漢書·卷十三·公孫述傳》明旦,岑降吳漢。乃夷述妻子,盡滅公孫氏,并族延岑。遂放兵大掠,焚述宮室。帝聞之怒,以譴漢。
《三國志·魏書二十八·諸葛誕傳》厚養親附及揚州輕俠者數千人為死士。
《三國志注·魏書二十八·諸葛誕傳》魏書曰:誕賞賜過度。有犯死者,虧制以活之。
《三國志·魏書二十八·鄧艾傳》使於綿竹築臺以為京觀,用彰戰功。士卒死事者,皆與蜀兵同共埋藏。
https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh/京观
I do acknowledge and admit that the “two separate events” argument is certainly possible and I may be wrong, but it just seems strange to me to bring up a Mound Tower and then mention burials right after it if they are supposed to be separate incidents. It would also be strange to bring it up right before the other anecdotes of Dèng Ài’s two arrogant quotes he allegedly made to the surrendered Shǔ officials. Structurally, it would seem to me that all the anecdotes are supposed to be about Dèng Ài’s growing arrogance and lack of tact, so the mention of the shared burial is supposed to be an additional detail to the Mound Tower story to show he went even further than usual in building a monument to his own achievements.
Or maybe I’m just too cynical. I mean, surely no one would be that crass, right?
《三國志·魏書二十八·鄧艾傳》有識者笑之。
Deng Ai's behavior reads like a classic case of megalomania, an old man losing himself in celebrating his life's greatest accomplishment, rather than a prelude to rebellion. If he'd truly been planning a revolt, certainly he would have behaved in a more restrained manner. His story reminds me of Xu You's - drunk on his own success, he treads on the wrong toes.
Even if he'd been planning a revolt, I would find it hard to blame him or call him immoral for doing so. There's nothing treasonous in rebelling against the man who murdered his rightful emperor and then killed his own assassins in a psychopathic coup d'etat only a few years earlier.